1
00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:09,589
[Music]

2
00:00:14,250 --> 00:00:12,549
this is somewhere in the skies with ryan

3
00:00:35,270 --> 00:00:14,260
spread

4
00:00:39,030 --> 00:00:37,110
the subcommittee will come to order

5
00:00:40,709 --> 00:00:39,040
without objection the chair may declare

6
00:00:41,990 --> 00:00:40,719
recess at any time

7
00:00:43,830 --> 00:00:42,000
before we get started i want to

8
00:00:45,910 --> 00:00:43,840
recognize a moment of silence for the

9
00:00:47,830 --> 00:00:45,920
victims of the white supremacist hate

10
00:00:49,910 --> 00:00:47,840
crime in buffalo new york the

11
00:00:52,069 --> 00:00:49,920
subcommittee has focused intently on

12
00:00:54,549 --> 00:00:52,079
that threat in both open and closed

13
00:00:56,830 --> 00:00:54,559
hearings it is utterly devastating to

14
00:01:06,870 --> 00:00:56,840
see more victims of this violence

15
00:01:10,390 --> 00:01:09,429
with that i ask my colleagues to join

16
00:01:12,390 --> 00:01:10,400
pardon me

17
00:01:16,070 --> 00:01:12,400
we will now turn to the business of this

18
00:01:20,870 --> 00:01:18,070
more than 50 years ago

19
00:01:21,830 --> 00:01:20,880
the u.s government ended project blue

20
00:01:24,469 --> 00:01:21,840
book

21
00:01:26,870 --> 00:01:24,479
an effort to catalog and understand

22
00:01:29,590 --> 00:01:26,880
sightings of objects in the air

23
00:01:31,670 --> 00:01:29,600
that could not otherwise be explained

24
00:01:34,069 --> 00:01:31,680
for more than 20 years that project had

25
00:01:36,789 --> 00:01:34,079
treated unidentified anomalies in our

26
00:01:38,830 --> 00:01:36,799
airspace as a national security threat

27
00:01:41,510 --> 00:01:38,840
to be monitored and

28
00:01:42,710 --> 00:01:41,520
investigated in 2017 we learned for the

29
00:01:45,429 --> 00:01:42,720
first time that the department of

30
00:01:47,749 --> 00:01:45,439
defense had quietly restarted a similar

31
00:01:50,149 --> 00:01:47,759
organization tracking what we now call

32
00:01:51,030 --> 00:01:50,159
unidentified aerial phenomena

33
00:01:52,630 --> 00:01:51,040
or

34
00:01:55,109 --> 00:01:52,640
uaps

35
00:01:57,350 --> 00:01:55,119
last year congress rewrote the charter

36
00:01:59,350 --> 00:01:57,360
for that organization now called the

37
00:02:01,429 --> 00:01:59,360
airborne object identification and

38
00:02:02,469 --> 00:02:01,439
management synchronization group

39
00:02:04,789 --> 00:02:02,479
or

40
00:02:06,789 --> 00:02:04,799
aim sog

41
00:02:09,190 --> 00:02:06,799
for short today we will bring that

42
00:02:11,589 --> 00:02:09,200
organization out of the shadows

43
00:02:12,390 --> 00:02:11,599
this hearing and oversight work

44
00:02:16,070 --> 00:02:12,400
has

45
00:02:19,030 --> 00:02:16,080
a simple idea at its core

46
00:02:21,589 --> 00:02:19,040
unidentified aerial phenomena are a

47
00:02:23,510 --> 00:02:21,599
potential national security threat and

48
00:02:26,229 --> 00:02:23,520
they need to be treated that way for too

49
00:02:27,830 --> 00:02:26,239
long the stigma associated with uaps has

50
00:02:29,110 --> 00:02:27,840
gotten in the way of good intelligence

51
00:02:31,350 --> 00:02:29,120
analysis

52
00:02:33,030 --> 00:02:31,360
pilots avoided reporting or were laughed

53
00:02:35,190 --> 00:02:33,040
at when they did

54
00:02:37,190 --> 00:02:35,200
dod officials relegated the issue to the

55
00:02:38,309 --> 00:02:37,200
back room or swept it under the rug

56
00:02:40,869 --> 00:02:38,319
entirely

57
00:02:42,869 --> 00:02:40,879
fearful of a skeptical national security

58
00:02:44,229 --> 00:02:42,879
community today

59
00:02:47,030 --> 00:02:44,239
we know better

60
00:02:48,390 --> 00:02:47,040
uaps are unexplained it's true

61
00:02:50,390 --> 00:02:48,400
but they are real

62
00:02:53,190 --> 00:02:50,400
they need to be investigated and many

63
00:02:56,630 --> 00:02:53,200
threats they pose need to be mitigated

64
00:02:59,270 --> 00:02:56,640
under secretary moultrie mr bray

65
00:03:01,270 --> 00:02:59,280
thank you for coming today

66
00:03:03,430 --> 00:03:01,280
first we need you to update us on the

67
00:03:05,430 --> 00:03:03,440
status of aim salk

68
00:03:07,190 --> 00:03:05,440
the legislation creating it was passed

69
00:03:09,430 --> 00:03:07,200
in december the deadline for

70
00:03:12,149 --> 00:03:09,440
implementation is fast approaching

71
00:03:13,509 --> 00:03:12,159
but the group does not even have a name

72
00:03:16,149 --> 00:03:13,519
director

73
00:03:18,470 --> 00:03:16,159
we need to know sirs the status of the

74
00:03:20,229 --> 00:03:18,480
organization in the obstacle to getting

75
00:03:21,509 --> 00:03:20,239
it up and running

76
00:03:24,229 --> 00:03:21,519
secondly

77
00:03:25,990 --> 00:03:24,239
you have to convince the audience today

78
00:03:29,750 --> 00:03:26,000
and most especially

79
00:03:31,270 --> 00:03:29,760
our military and civilian aviators

80
00:03:33,589 --> 00:03:31,280
the culture

81
00:03:35,830 --> 00:03:33,599
has changed

82
00:03:38,949 --> 00:03:35,840
that those who report uaps will be

83
00:03:41,110 --> 00:03:38,959
treated as witnesses not as kooks

84
00:03:44,149 --> 00:03:41,120
thirdly you need to show us

85
00:03:46,470 --> 00:03:44,159
congress and the american public whose

86
00:03:48,309 --> 00:03:46,480
imaginations you have captured

87
00:03:49,910 --> 00:03:48,319
you are willing to follow the facts

88
00:03:51,910 --> 00:03:49,920
where they lead

89
00:03:54,070 --> 00:03:51,920
you know we fear sometimes that the dod

90
00:03:55,830 --> 00:03:54,080
is focused more on emphasizing what it

91
00:03:58,789 --> 00:03:55,840
can explain

92
00:04:01,509 --> 00:03:58,799
not investigating what it can

93
00:04:03,509 --> 00:04:01,519
i'm looking for you to assure us today

94
00:04:05,670 --> 00:04:03,519
that all conclusions are on the table

95
00:04:08,470 --> 00:04:05,680
one final note we are mindful today that

96
00:04:10,550 --> 00:04:08,480
aimsawg is not starting from scratch

97
00:04:13,190 --> 00:04:10,560
this is the third version of this task

98
00:04:16,949 --> 00:04:13,200
force in dod and civil society groups

99
00:04:18,789 --> 00:04:16,959
like the mutual ufo network

100
00:04:21,349 --> 00:04:18,799
mr corbell and others have been

101
00:04:22,950 --> 00:04:21,359
collecting data on this issue for years

102
00:04:24,790 --> 00:04:22,960
i hope you'll explain how you can

103
00:04:27,350 --> 00:04:24,800
leverage the knowledge and experience of

104
00:04:30,230 --> 00:04:27,360
our prior work on this matter to move

105
00:04:32,870 --> 00:04:30,240
the aim saw along the last time congress

106
00:04:33,749 --> 00:04:32,880
had a hearing on uaps was half a century

107
00:04:36,150 --> 00:04:33,759
ago

108
00:04:37,749 --> 00:04:36,160
i hope that it does not take 50 more

109
00:04:39,510 --> 00:04:37,759
years for congress to hold another

110
00:04:41,590 --> 00:04:39,520
because transparency is desperately

111
00:04:44,550 --> 00:04:41,600
needed i now turn to ranking member

112
00:04:46,710 --> 00:04:44,560
crawford for comments he'd like to make

113
00:04:48,150 --> 00:04:46,720
thank you mr chairman um honorable

114
00:04:50,310 --> 00:04:48,160
moultrie mr bray thank you for coming

115
00:04:51,909 --> 00:04:50,320
here today we appreciate it to begin the

116
00:04:54,150 --> 00:04:51,919
open dialogue between congress and the

117
00:04:55,830 --> 00:04:54,160
executive branch on this important topic

118
00:04:57,830 --> 00:04:55,840
while this topic evokes creative

119
00:04:59,510 --> 00:04:57,840
imaginations of many aside from all the

120
00:05:02,870 --> 00:04:59,520
hype and speculation there are important

121
00:05:04,550 --> 00:05:02,880
underlying issues posed by uaps despite

122
00:05:05,830 --> 00:05:04,560
the serious nature of this topic i have

123
00:05:07,270 --> 00:05:05,840
to say i'm more interested in our

124
00:05:08,710 --> 00:05:07,280
understanding of chinese and russian

125
00:05:10,230 --> 00:05:08,720
hypersonic weapon development or

126
00:05:12,469 --> 00:05:10,240
understanding why this administration

127
00:05:14,710 --> 00:05:12,479
was so slow to share actionable

128
00:05:16,230 --> 00:05:14,720
intelligence with the ukrainians however

129
00:05:17,990 --> 00:05:16,240
as much as this topic may help us better

130
00:05:21,110 --> 00:05:18,000
understand unknown activities of russia

131
00:05:22,870 --> 00:05:21,120
and china i am on board the intelligence

132
00:05:24,310 --> 00:05:22,880
community has a serious duty to our

133
00:05:26,310 --> 00:05:24,320
taxpayers to prevent potential

134
00:05:28,390 --> 00:05:26,320
adversaries such as china and russia

135
00:05:30,230 --> 00:05:28,400
from surprising us with unforeseen new

136
00:05:31,749 --> 00:05:30,240
technologies

137
00:05:32,950 --> 00:05:31,759
as overseers of the intelligence

138
00:05:35,110 --> 00:05:32,960
community this committee has an

139
00:05:37,110 --> 00:05:35,120
obligation to understand what you are

140
00:05:39,590 --> 00:05:37,120
doing to determine whether any uaps are

141
00:05:41,990 --> 00:05:39,600
new technologies or not and if they are

142
00:05:43,749 --> 00:05:42,000
where they coming from in general the ic

143
00:05:45,749 --> 00:05:43,759
spends much of its time and resources

144
00:05:47,670 --> 00:05:45,759
trying to understand what we call known

145
00:05:49,590 --> 00:05:47,680
unknowns when it comes to foreign

146
00:05:51,189 --> 00:05:49,600
nations weapons systems and sensors

147
00:05:53,350 --> 00:05:51,199
known unknowns are those features that

148
00:05:55,430 --> 00:05:53,360
we don't fully understand yet the

149
00:05:57,430 --> 00:05:55,440
challenge associated with uap is that

150
00:05:59,189 --> 00:05:57,440
they are completely unknown and require

151
00:06:01,350 --> 00:05:59,199
a more expansive collection analysis

152
00:06:03,350 --> 00:06:01,360
effort the intelligence community must

153
00:06:05,189 --> 00:06:03,360
balance addressing known threats to our

154
00:06:07,510 --> 00:06:05,199
nation national security with preventing

155
00:06:08,950 --> 00:06:07,520
technical surprise we must continue to

156
00:06:10,469 --> 00:06:08,960
follow the facts where they lead us and

157
00:06:13,110 --> 00:06:10,479
ensure that there are no technical

158
00:06:14,790 --> 00:06:13,120
surprises the ic must take it seriously

159
00:06:16,790 --> 00:06:14,800
when there are credible observations of

160
00:06:18,870 --> 00:06:16,800
phenomena that seem to perform in ways

161
00:06:20,390 --> 00:06:18,880
that could pose a threat to safe flight

162
00:06:22,150 --> 00:06:20,400
operations or they could be signs of a

163
00:06:23,189 --> 00:06:22,160
foreign adversary's attempt to develop a

164
00:06:25,189 --> 00:06:23,199
strategic

165
00:06:26,550 --> 00:06:25,199
technological surprise against the

166
00:06:28,150 --> 00:06:26,560
united states

167
00:06:30,390 --> 00:06:28,160
it's also essential that our pilots and

168
00:06:33,990 --> 00:06:30,400
others feel they can report uaps they

169
00:06:36,230 --> 00:06:34,000
observe without any stigma for doing so

170
00:06:37,749 --> 00:06:36,240
this is the open unclassified portion of

171
00:06:40,070 --> 00:06:37,759
our hearing we'll have a closed

172
00:06:41,270 --> 00:06:40,080
classified part later it's important for

173
00:06:43,590 --> 00:06:41,280
the public to know that the

174
00:06:45,990 --> 00:06:43,600
classification of information exists to

175
00:06:47,749 --> 00:06:46,000
protect national security not to try to

176
00:06:49,589 --> 00:06:47,759
hide the truth when we're trying to

177
00:06:51,350 --> 00:06:49,599
determine if any uaps are new

178
00:06:53,510 --> 00:06:51,360
technologies being developed by foreign

179
00:06:55,589 --> 00:06:53,520
governments we are inevitably going to

180
00:06:57,749 --> 00:06:55,599
run into classified information about

181
00:07:00,070 --> 00:06:57,759
what new systems and technologies we do

182
00:07:02,309 --> 00:07:00,080
know or in the works here or abroad but

183
00:07:03,830 --> 00:07:02,319
where information does not risk national

184
00:07:05,990 --> 00:07:03,840
security it should be shared with our

185
00:07:07,510 --> 00:07:06,000
allies and the public when feasible i

186
00:07:09,189 --> 00:07:07,520
hope that we can have your assurance to

187
00:07:10,550 --> 00:07:09,199
this end today it's my hope that the

188
00:07:12,390 --> 00:07:10,560
intelligence community will continue to

189
00:07:14,390 --> 00:07:12,400
try to determine the nature of uaps

190
00:07:15,990 --> 00:07:14,400
we've observed and will keep congress

191
00:07:16,950 --> 00:07:16,000
fully apprised of all developments i

192
00:07:18,870 --> 00:07:16,960
look forward to this hearing and

193
00:07:21,270 --> 00:07:18,880
continue continue dialoguing oversight

194
00:07:23,110 --> 00:07:21,280
with the intelligence community on this

195
00:07:24,790 --> 00:07:23,120
topic without a yield back

196
00:07:26,070 --> 00:07:24,800
gentleman yields back and now we'll turn

197
00:07:27,430 --> 00:07:26,080
to our distinguished chairman adam

198
00:07:28,309 --> 00:07:27,440
schiff for any comments he wishes to

199
00:07:30,309 --> 00:07:28,319
make

200
00:07:32,550 --> 00:07:30,319
thank you chairman carson uh for holding

201
00:07:34,469 --> 00:07:32,560
this open hearing on unidentified aerial

202
00:07:35,670 --> 00:07:34,479
phenomenon and for your leadership on

203
00:07:37,029 --> 00:07:35,680
this issue

204
00:07:39,749 --> 00:07:37,039
holding a portion of our discussion

205
00:07:42,150 --> 00:07:39,759
today in open session is critical to the

206
00:07:43,749 --> 00:07:42,160
cause of transparency and openness

207
00:07:45,589 --> 00:07:43,759
which was congress's intent in

208
00:07:46,790 --> 00:07:45,599
authorizing and funding this new task

209
00:07:48,150 --> 00:07:46,800
force

210
00:07:50,790 --> 00:07:48,160
the larger effort that is being

211
00:07:51,909 --> 00:07:50,800
undertaken to study and characterize uap

212
00:07:53,270 --> 00:07:51,919
reports

213
00:07:55,350 --> 00:07:53,280
is an important step towards

214
00:07:57,110 --> 00:07:55,360
understanding these phenomenon what we

215
00:07:58,790 --> 00:07:57,120
know and don't know

216
00:08:00,309 --> 00:07:58,800
and i look forward to hearing more

217
00:08:01,589 --> 00:08:00,319
during both the open session and the

218
00:08:04,710 --> 00:08:01,599
closed setting

219
00:08:06,150 --> 00:08:04,720
about how dod and the ic are undertaking

220
00:08:08,309 --> 00:08:06,160
that task

221
00:08:09,990 --> 00:08:08,319
uap reports have been around for decades

222
00:08:12,469 --> 00:08:10,000
and yet we haven't had an orderly way

223
00:08:14,390 --> 00:08:12,479
for them to be reported without stigma

224
00:08:16,710 --> 00:08:14,400
and to be investigated

225
00:08:18,710 --> 00:08:16,720
that needs to change uap reports need to

226
00:08:20,790 --> 00:08:18,720
be understood as a national security

227
00:08:23,029 --> 00:08:20,800
matter and that message needs to go out

228
00:08:24,309 --> 00:08:23,039
across dod the ic and the whole of the

229
00:08:25,589 --> 00:08:24,319
u.s government

230
00:08:27,670 --> 00:08:25,599
when we spot something we don't

231
00:08:29,430 --> 00:08:27,680
understand or can't identify in our

232
00:08:31,589 --> 00:08:29,440
airspace it's the job of those we

233
00:08:33,990 --> 00:08:31,599
entrust with our national security to

234
00:08:35,589 --> 00:08:34,000
investigate and to report back

235
00:08:37,350 --> 00:08:35,599
that is why it's important that we hold

236
00:08:39,670 --> 00:08:37,360
this open hearing for the public to hear

237
00:08:41,909 --> 00:08:39,680
directly from the department of defense

238
00:08:44,230 --> 00:08:41,919
on the steps it's taking to track

239
00:08:45,670 --> 00:08:44,240
analyze and transparently communicate

240
00:08:46,630 --> 00:08:45,680
the work that is being done on this

241
00:08:48,310 --> 00:08:46,640
issue

242
00:08:49,750 --> 00:08:48,320
it is also the responsibility of our

243
00:08:51,110 --> 00:08:49,760
government and this panel to share as

244
00:08:53,350 --> 00:08:51,120
much as we can

245
00:08:55,430 --> 00:08:53,360
with the american people since excessive

246
00:08:57,350 --> 00:08:55,440
secrecy only breeds distrust and

247
00:08:59,030 --> 00:08:57,360
speculation

248
00:09:00,630 --> 00:08:59,040
i look forward to hearing how the uap

249
00:09:02,470 --> 00:09:00,640
task force is being stood up what

250
00:09:03,990 --> 00:09:02,480
challenges they still face

251
00:09:06,389 --> 00:09:04,000
and how this committee can make sure the

252
00:09:09,110 --> 00:09:06,399
task force is able to shed light on one

253
00:09:11,590 --> 00:09:09,120
of the world's most enduring mysteries

254
00:09:13,829 --> 00:09:11,600
i thank you gentlemen for your work and

255
00:09:14,870 --> 00:09:13,839
i'll be very interested to hear what you

256
00:09:16,790 --> 00:09:14,880
have to say

257
00:09:18,150 --> 00:09:16,800
to me among the most fascinating

258
00:09:20,790 --> 00:09:18,160
questions

259
00:09:23,590 --> 00:09:20,800
are these phenomena that we can

260
00:09:25,990 --> 00:09:23,600
measure that is uh instruments report

261
00:09:27,110 --> 00:09:26,000
there is something there it is not the

262
00:09:29,509 --> 00:09:27,120
human eye

263
00:09:31,190 --> 00:09:29,519
confusing objects in the sky

264
00:09:33,190 --> 00:09:31,200
there is something there measurable by

265
00:09:35,509 --> 00:09:33,200
multiple instruments and yet it seems to

266
00:09:37,990 --> 00:09:35,519
move in directions that are inconsistent

267
00:09:39,829 --> 00:09:38,000
with what we know of physics or science

268
00:09:42,790 --> 00:09:39,839
more broadly and

269
00:09:44,710 --> 00:09:42,800
uh that to me poses uh questions of of

270
00:09:47,190 --> 00:09:44,720
tremendous interest and

271
00:09:49,110 --> 00:09:47,200
as well as potential national security

272
00:09:50,550 --> 00:09:49,120
significance so we look forward to

273
00:09:51,990 --> 00:09:50,560
hearing what you're able to report to us

274
00:09:54,470 --> 00:09:52,000
today in open session and i want to

275
00:09:56,310 --> 00:09:54,480
thank chairman carson again for his

276
00:09:58,310 --> 00:09:56,320
extraordinary leadership on this issue

277
00:10:00,389 --> 00:09:58,320
and i yield back

278
00:10:01,509 --> 00:10:00,399
chairman yul's back thank you with that

279
00:10:04,069 --> 00:10:01,519
we will start our hearing under

280
00:10:06,230 --> 00:10:04,079
secretary moultrie the floor is your sir

281
00:10:07,509 --> 00:10:06,240
thank you

282
00:10:09,509 --> 00:10:07,519
chairman schiff

283
00:10:11,190 --> 00:10:09,519
committee chairman carson ranking member

284
00:10:13,350 --> 00:10:11,200
crawford distinguished members of the

285
00:10:15,110 --> 00:10:13,360
subcommittee it's a privilege to be here

286
00:10:17,269 --> 00:10:15,120
with you today to address your questions

287
00:10:18,710 --> 00:10:17,279
regarding unidentified aerial phenomena

288
00:10:20,550 --> 00:10:18,720
or uap

289
00:10:22,550 --> 00:10:20,560
i'm pleased to be joined by mr scott

290
00:10:23,829 --> 00:10:22,560
bray the deputy director of naval

291
00:10:26,150 --> 00:10:23,839
intelligence who will speak to the

292
00:10:28,550 --> 00:10:26,160
navy's unidentified aerial phenomenon

293
00:10:31,110 --> 00:10:28,560
task force which laid the foundation for

294
00:10:32,710 --> 00:10:31,120
the efforts we will discuss today

295
00:10:35,350 --> 00:10:32,720
first i'd like to thank congress for

296
00:10:38,790 --> 00:10:35,360
supporting the department's uap efforts

297
00:10:41,190 --> 00:10:38,800
the ndaa for fiscal year 2022 has helped

298
00:10:43,590 --> 00:10:41,200
us to establish a dedicated office to

299
00:10:46,310 --> 00:10:43,600
oversee processes and procedures for the

300
00:10:49,190 --> 00:10:46,320
timey collection processing analysis and

301
00:10:50,710 --> 00:10:49,200
reporting of uap related data

302
00:10:53,910 --> 00:10:50,720
what are you ap

303
00:10:56,470 --> 00:10:53,920
put simply uap or airborne objects that

304
00:10:57,750 --> 00:10:56,480
when encountered cannot be immediately

305
00:10:59,269 --> 00:10:57,760
identified

306
00:11:00,470 --> 00:10:59,279
however it is the department's

307
00:11:02,230 --> 00:11:00,480
contention

308
00:11:04,710 --> 00:11:02,240
that by combining appropriately

309
00:11:06,389 --> 00:11:04,720
structured collected data with rigorous

310
00:11:08,710 --> 00:11:06,399
scientific analysis

311
00:11:11,030 --> 00:11:08,720
any object that we encounter

312
00:11:14,230 --> 00:11:11,040
can likely be

313
00:11:17,269 --> 00:11:14,240
isolated characterized identified and if

314
00:11:19,990 --> 00:11:17,279
necessary mitigated

315
00:11:22,389 --> 00:11:20,000
we know that our service members have

316
00:11:25,030 --> 00:11:22,399
encountered unidentified aerial

317
00:11:26,630 --> 00:11:25,040
phenomena and because uaps pose

318
00:11:29,269 --> 00:11:26,640
potential flight safety and general

319
00:11:30,790 --> 00:11:29,279
security risk we are committed to a

320
00:11:32,310 --> 00:11:30,800
focused effort to determine their

321
00:11:34,069 --> 00:11:32,320
origins

322
00:11:35,670 --> 00:11:34,079
our effort will include the thorough

323
00:11:37,750 --> 00:11:35,680
examination of

324
00:11:40,310 --> 00:11:37,760
adversarial platforms and potential

325
00:11:43,190 --> 00:11:40,320
breakthrough technologies us government

326
00:11:46,550 --> 00:11:43,200
or commercial platforms allied or

327
00:11:49,670 --> 00:11:46,560
partner systems and other natural

328
00:11:55,030 --> 00:11:51,990
we also understand that there has been a

329
00:11:57,269 --> 00:11:55,040
cultural stigma surrounding uap

330
00:11:59,110 --> 00:11:57,279
our goal is to eliminate the stigma by

331
00:12:01,350 --> 00:11:59,120
fully incorporating our operators and

332
00:12:03,590 --> 00:12:01,360
mission personnel into a standardized

333
00:12:06,949 --> 00:12:03,600
data gathering process

334
00:12:09,430 --> 00:12:06,959
we believe that making uap reporting a

335
00:12:11,190 --> 00:12:09,440
mission imperative will be instrumental

336
00:12:12,870 --> 00:12:11,200
to the effort's success

337
00:12:14,790 --> 00:12:12,880
the defense intelligence and security

338
00:12:16,629 --> 00:12:14,800
enterprise provides real-time support to

339
00:12:18,389 --> 00:12:16,639
our war fighters and mission personnel

340
00:12:21,350 --> 00:12:18,399
across all domains

341
00:12:23,190 --> 00:12:21,360
to optimize the department's uap work we

342
00:12:24,949 --> 00:12:23,200
are establishing an office

343
00:12:26,150 --> 00:12:24,959
within the office of the secretary of

344
00:12:28,629 --> 00:12:26,160
defense

345
00:12:30,310 --> 00:12:28,639
that office's function is clear to

346
00:12:32,389 --> 00:12:30,320
facilitate the identification of

347
00:12:35,110 --> 00:12:32,399
previously unknown or unidentified

348
00:12:37,110 --> 00:12:35,120
airborne objects in a methodical logical

349
00:12:39,430 --> 00:12:37,120
and standardized manner

350
00:12:40,949 --> 00:12:39,440
these goals will ensure that we are

351
00:12:42,629 --> 00:12:40,959
working closely with operational

352
00:12:45,030 --> 00:12:42,639
personnel on training and reporting

353
00:12:46,870 --> 00:12:45,040
requirements developing data and

354
00:12:48,949 --> 00:12:46,880
intelligence requirements

355
00:12:50,470 --> 00:12:48,959
standardizing and integrating processes

356
00:12:52,470 --> 00:12:50,480
and procedures for collection

357
00:12:54,790 --> 00:12:52,480
operational surveillance analysis and

358
00:12:56,710 --> 00:12:54,800
reporting leveraging our research and

359
00:12:58,949 --> 00:12:56,720
development capabilities to improve

360
00:13:01,509 --> 00:12:58,959
detection characterization and

361
00:13:03,829 --> 00:13:01,519
identification of uaps developing

362
00:13:05,590 --> 00:13:03,839
mitigating solutions and procedures and

363
00:13:07,030 --> 00:13:05,600
identifying strategy and policy

364
00:13:09,030 --> 00:13:07,040
solutions

365
00:13:10,870 --> 00:13:09,040
this effort will maximize collaboration

366
00:13:12,710 --> 00:13:10,880
and build upon already existing

367
00:13:14,710 --> 00:13:12,720
relationships with the office of the

368
00:13:18,470 --> 00:13:14,720
director of national intelligence the

369
00:13:20,069 --> 00:13:18,480
faa dhs and the fbi

370
00:13:21,269 --> 00:13:20,079
we are also committed to strong

371
00:13:25,269 --> 00:13:21,279
partnerships with the department of

372
00:13:27,509 --> 00:13:25,279
energy noaa the dea nasa

373
00:13:29,430 --> 00:13:27,519
and the national labs and just as

374
00:13:31,030 --> 00:13:29,440
importantly our international partners

375
00:13:32,829 --> 00:13:31,040
and allies

376
00:13:35,430 --> 00:13:32,839
with regard to the importance of

377
00:13:37,910 --> 00:13:35,440
transparency the department is fully

378
00:13:39,750 --> 00:13:37,920
committed to the principle of openness

379
00:13:40,949 --> 00:13:39,760
and accountability to the american

380
00:13:43,110 --> 00:13:40,959
people

381
00:13:45,430 --> 00:13:43,120
however we are also mindful of our

382
00:13:47,509 --> 00:13:45,440
obligation to protect sensitive sources

383
00:13:48,949 --> 00:13:47,519
and methods our goal is to strike that

384
00:13:50,710 --> 00:13:48,959
delicate balance

385
00:13:53,030 --> 00:13:50,720
one that enables us to maintain the

386
00:13:54,710 --> 00:13:53,040
public's trust while preserving those

387
00:13:58,230 --> 00:13:54,720
capabilities that are vital to the

388
00:14:00,389 --> 00:13:58,240
support of our service personnel

389
00:14:01,670 --> 00:14:00,399
in closing the department is committed

390
00:14:03,430 --> 00:14:01,680
to this effort and welcomes the

391
00:14:04,790 --> 00:14:03,440
challenge we thank you for your

392
00:14:11,829 --> 00:14:04,800
committed support

393
00:14:15,509 --> 00:14:13,829
chairman chief chairman carson ranking

394
00:14:17,189 --> 00:14:15,519
member crawford and committee members

395
00:14:18,389 --> 00:14:17,199
thank you very much for the opportunity

396
00:14:19,590 --> 00:14:18,399
to be here today to highlight the

397
00:14:22,069 --> 00:14:19,600
ongoing work of the department of

398
00:14:25,590 --> 00:14:22,079
defense regarding unidentified aerial

399
00:14:27,670 --> 00:14:25,600
phenomena since the early 2000s

400
00:14:29,829 --> 00:14:27,680
we have seen an increasing number of

401
00:14:30,870 --> 00:14:29,839
unauthorized and or unidentified

402
00:14:33,030 --> 00:14:30,880
aircraft or objects in

403
00:14:34,949 --> 00:14:33,040
military-controlled training areas

404
00:14:35,990 --> 00:14:34,959
and training ranges and other designated

405
00:14:38,310 --> 00:14:36,000
airspace

406
00:14:39,590 --> 00:14:38,320
reports of sightings are frequent and

407
00:14:41,590 --> 00:14:39,600
continuing

408
00:14:43,269 --> 00:14:41,600
we attribute this increase in reporting

409
00:14:45,590 --> 00:14:43,279
to a number of factors including our

410
00:14:47,590 --> 00:14:45,600
work to destigmatize reporting an

411
00:14:49,590 --> 00:14:47,600
increase in the number of new systems

412
00:14:51,829 --> 00:14:49,600
such as quadcopters and unmanned aerial

413
00:14:53,509 --> 00:14:51,839
systems that are in our airspace

414
00:14:55,430 --> 00:14:53,519
identification of what we can classify

415
00:14:57,509 --> 00:14:55,440
as clutter mylar balloons and other

416
00:14:59,430 --> 00:14:57,519
types of air trash

417
00:15:01,750 --> 00:14:59,440
and improvements in the capabilities of

418
00:15:03,350 --> 00:15:01,760
our various sensors to detect things in

419
00:15:05,269 --> 00:15:03,360
our airspace

420
00:15:06,710 --> 00:15:05,279
almost two years ago in august of 2020

421
00:15:07,990 --> 00:15:06,720
deputy secretary defense nordquist

422
00:15:10,310 --> 00:15:08,000
directed the establishment of the

423
00:15:12,870 --> 00:15:10,320
unidentified aerial phenomena task force

424
00:15:14,710 --> 00:15:12,880
within the department of the navy the

425
00:15:16,949 --> 00:15:14,720
uap task force was built on the

426
00:15:18,470 --> 00:15:16,959
foundation of the navy's initial efforts

427
00:15:21,030 --> 00:15:18,480
to respond to the reports from our

428
00:15:23,030 --> 00:15:21,040
aviators on unidentified objects

429
00:15:25,509 --> 00:15:23,040
observed in our training ranges

430
00:15:26,470 --> 00:15:25,519
the basic issues then and now are

431
00:15:27,509 --> 00:15:26,480
twofold

432
00:15:29,189 --> 00:15:27,519
first

433
00:15:31,189 --> 00:15:29,199
incursions in our training ranges by

434
00:15:33,189 --> 00:15:31,199
unidentified objects represent serious

435
00:15:36,310 --> 00:15:33,199
hazards to safety of flight

436
00:15:38,629 --> 00:15:36,320
in every aspect of naval aviation safety

437
00:15:39,749 --> 00:15:38,639
of our air crews is paramount

438
00:15:41,749 --> 00:15:39,759
second

439
00:15:43,990 --> 00:15:41,759
intrusions by unknown aircraft or

440
00:15:46,790 --> 00:15:44,000
objects pose potential threats to the

441
00:15:49,110 --> 00:15:46,800
security of our operations our aviators

442
00:15:51,269 --> 00:15:49,120
train as they would fight

443
00:15:53,350 --> 00:15:51,279
so any intrusions that may compromise

444
00:15:55,590 --> 00:15:53,360
the security of our operations by

445
00:15:57,430 --> 00:15:55,600
revealing our capabilities our tactics

446
00:15:59,910 --> 00:15:57,440
techniques or procedures

447
00:16:01,829 --> 00:15:59,920
are of great concern to the navy and the

448
00:16:03,829 --> 00:16:01,839
department of defense

449
00:16:06,949 --> 00:16:03,839
from the very beginning we took these

450
00:16:08,710 --> 00:16:06,959
reports very seriously we instituted a

451
00:16:10,470 --> 00:16:08,720
data-driven approach to the

452
00:16:12,629 --> 00:16:10,480
investigations where we could collect as

453
00:16:15,030 --> 00:16:12,639
much data as possible and use all

454
00:16:16,470 --> 00:16:15,040
available resources to analyze and make

455
00:16:18,949 --> 00:16:16,480
informed decisions on the best ways to

456
00:16:21,670 --> 00:16:18,959
address our findings our main objective

457
00:16:24,389 --> 00:16:21,680
was to transition uap efforts from an

458
00:16:27,030 --> 00:16:24,399
anecdotal or narrative based

459
00:16:29,990 --> 00:16:27,040
approach to a rigorous science and

460
00:16:31,910 --> 00:16:30,000
technology engineering focused study

461
00:16:33,910 --> 00:16:31,920
this data-driven approach

462
00:16:35,269 --> 00:16:33,920
requires input from a wide variety of

463
00:16:37,509 --> 00:16:35,279
sources

464
00:16:38,870 --> 00:16:37,519
in the early stages the task force

465
00:16:40,790 --> 00:16:38,880
worked to standardize the reporting

466
00:16:42,310 --> 00:16:40,800
mechanisms and processes to make it as

467
00:16:44,150 --> 00:16:42,320
easy as possible

468
00:16:46,069 --> 00:16:44,160
for personnel to report any engagement

469
00:16:47,910 --> 00:16:46,079
so that we were getting that wide range

470
00:16:49,910 --> 00:16:47,920
of reporting that we needed

471
00:16:51,350 --> 00:16:49,920
we also spent considerable efforts

472
00:16:53,189 --> 00:16:51,360
engaging directly with our naval

473
00:16:55,829 --> 00:16:53,199
aviators and building relationships to

474
00:16:57,749 --> 00:16:55,839
help destigmatize the act of reporting

475
00:16:59,509 --> 00:16:57,759
sightings or encounters

476
00:17:00,870 --> 00:16:59,519
and we worked with naval aviation

477
00:17:03,670 --> 00:17:00,880
leadership to provide additional

478
00:17:05,829 --> 00:17:03,680
equipment to record any encounter navy

479
00:17:07,590 --> 00:17:05,839
and air force crews now have

480
00:17:10,150 --> 00:17:07,600
step-by-step procedures for reporting on

481
00:17:12,549 --> 00:17:10,160
the uap on their knee board

482
00:17:13,829 --> 00:17:12,559
in their in the cockpit and

483
00:17:16,390 --> 00:17:13,839
in their post

484
00:17:18,390 --> 00:17:16,400
flight debrief procedures

485
00:17:20,630 --> 00:17:18,400
the direct result of those efforts has

486
00:17:21,990 --> 00:17:20,640
been increased reporting with increased

487
00:17:24,710 --> 00:17:22,000
opportunities to focus a number of

488
00:17:25,829 --> 00:17:24,720
sensors on any objects the message is

489
00:17:27,909 --> 00:17:25,839
now clear

490
00:17:28,630 --> 00:17:27,919
if you see something you need to report

491
00:17:30,470 --> 00:17:28,640
it

492
00:17:33,029 --> 00:17:30,480
and the message has been received in

493
00:17:34,549 --> 00:17:33,039
fact recently i received a call from a

494
00:17:35,669 --> 00:17:34,559
senior naval aviator with over two

495
00:17:38,150 --> 00:17:35,679
thousand flight hours he called me

496
00:17:41,590 --> 00:17:38,160
personally from the flight line uh after

497
00:17:44,390 --> 00:17:41,600
landing uh to talk about uh an encounter

498
00:17:46,070 --> 00:17:44,400
that he had just experienced

499
00:17:47,510 --> 00:17:46,080
those were just the initial steps we

500
00:17:48,870 --> 00:17:47,520
also made a concerted effort to assemble

501
00:17:49,830 --> 00:17:48,880
subject matter experts from across the

502
00:17:51,510 --> 00:17:49,840
department of defense in the

503
00:17:53,270 --> 00:17:51,520
intelligence community and other us

504
00:17:54,630 --> 00:17:53,280
government agencies and departments we

505
00:17:56,310 --> 00:17:54,640
forged partnerships with the research

506
00:17:57,990 --> 00:17:56,320
development and acquisition communities

507
00:17:59,990 --> 00:17:58,000
with industry partners and with academic

508
00:18:02,150 --> 00:18:00,000
research labs and we've brought many

509
00:18:04,630 --> 00:18:02,160
allies and international partners into

510
00:18:06,470 --> 00:18:04,640
our discussions on uap

511
00:18:08,630 --> 00:18:06,480
additionally subject matter experts from

512
00:18:12,390 --> 00:18:08,640
a wide variety of fields including

513
00:18:14,950 --> 00:18:12,400
physics optics metallurgy meteorology

514
00:18:17,110 --> 00:18:14,960
just name a few have been brought in to

515
00:18:19,430 --> 00:18:17,120
uh uh to expand our understanding in

516
00:18:20,630 --> 00:18:19,440
areas where me we may not have organic

517
00:18:22,310 --> 00:18:20,640
expertise

518
00:18:24,710 --> 00:18:22,320
in short we've endeavored to bring an

519
00:18:26,789 --> 00:18:24,720
all hands on deck approach uh to the to

520
00:18:29,270 --> 00:18:26,799
better understand this phenomena so what

521
00:18:32,710 --> 00:18:29,280
have we learned so far

522
00:18:36,150 --> 00:18:32,720
any given observation may be fleeting

523
00:18:39,350 --> 00:18:36,160
or longer it may be recorded or not it

524
00:18:41,110 --> 00:18:39,360
may be observable by one or multiple

525
00:18:43,510 --> 00:18:41,120
assets

526
00:18:44,950 --> 00:18:43,520
in short there's rarely an easy answer

527
00:18:47,190 --> 00:18:44,960
for example let me share with you the

528
00:18:59,110 --> 00:18:47,200
first video that we have here today

529
00:19:01,270 --> 00:19:00,470
there it was

530
00:19:03,110 --> 00:19:01,280
that's

531
00:19:06,549 --> 00:19:03,120
in many cases

532
00:19:08,630 --> 00:19:06,559
that's all that a report may include

533
00:19:12,150 --> 00:19:08,640
and in many other cases

534
00:19:14,150 --> 00:19:12,160
we have far less than this

535
00:19:15,430 --> 00:19:14,160
as we detailed in both the unclassified

536
00:19:16,789 --> 00:19:15,440
and classified versions of the

537
00:19:17,750 --> 00:19:16,799
preliminary assessment released by the

538
00:19:19,750 --> 00:19:17,760
office of the director of national

539
00:19:22,710 --> 00:19:19,760
intelligence last june this often

540
00:19:24,310 --> 00:19:22,720
limited amount of high quality data

541
00:19:26,230 --> 00:19:24,320
and reporting hampers our ability to

542
00:19:28,150 --> 00:19:26,240
draw firm conclusions about the nature

543
00:19:30,310 --> 00:19:28,160
or intent of uap

544
00:19:31,830 --> 00:19:30,320
as detailed in the odni report if and

545
00:19:34,390 --> 00:19:31,840
when individual uap incidents are

546
00:19:36,470 --> 00:19:34,400
resolved they likely fall into one of

547
00:19:38,710 --> 00:19:36,480
five potential explanatory categories

548
00:19:41,190 --> 00:19:38,720
airborne clutter natural atmospheric

549
00:19:43,430 --> 00:19:41,200
phenomena us government or u.s industry

550
00:19:45,110 --> 00:19:43,440
developmental programs foreign adversary

551
00:19:45,830 --> 00:19:45,120
systems or

552
00:19:53,590 --> 00:19:45,840
a

553
00:19:56,070 --> 00:19:53,600
scientific discovery

554
00:19:57,350 --> 00:19:56,080
we stand by those initial results

555
00:19:59,750 --> 00:19:57,360
since the release of that preliminary

556
00:20:02,710 --> 00:19:59,760
report the uap task force database has

557
00:20:04,070 --> 00:20:02,720
now grown to contain approximately 400

558
00:20:07,029 --> 00:20:04,080
reports

559
00:20:08,470 --> 00:20:07,039
the stigma has been reduced

560
00:20:10,310 --> 00:20:08,480
we've also made progress in resolving

561
00:20:11,909 --> 00:20:10,320
the character of a limited number of uap

562
00:20:14,710 --> 00:20:11,919
encounters for example let me show you a

563
00:20:18,470 --> 00:20:14,720
couple of another video and image

564
00:20:21,029 --> 00:20:18,480
taken years apart in different areas

565
00:20:22,630 --> 00:20:21,039
in this video u.s navy personnel

566
00:20:25,430 --> 00:20:22,640
recorded what appears to be triangles

567
00:20:27,590 --> 00:20:25,440
some flashing recorded several years ago

568
00:20:29,190 --> 00:20:27,600
off the coast of the united states

569
00:20:29,909 --> 00:20:29,200
this was recorded while the u.s navy

570
00:20:31,909 --> 00:20:29,919
ship

571
00:20:34,630 --> 00:20:31,919
observed a number of small unmanned

572
00:20:36,950 --> 00:20:34,640
aerial systems in the area

573
00:20:38,870 --> 00:20:36,960
importantly the video was taken through

574
00:20:40,710 --> 00:20:38,880
night vision goggles with a single lens

575
00:20:42,789 --> 00:20:40,720
reflex camera

576
00:21:06,870 --> 00:20:42,799
these remained unresolved for several

577
00:21:11,590 --> 00:21:09,430
several years later

578
00:21:14,390 --> 00:21:11,600
and off a different coast

579
00:21:16,070 --> 00:21:14,400
u.s navy personnel again in a swarm of

580
00:21:18,549 --> 00:21:16,080
unmanned aerial systems and again

581
00:21:19,830 --> 00:21:18,559
through night vision goggles and an slr

582
00:21:21,909 --> 00:21:19,840
camera

583
00:21:23,270 --> 00:21:21,919
recorded this image

584
00:21:25,110 --> 00:21:23,280
but this time

585
00:21:27,270 --> 00:21:25,120
other us navy assets also observed

586
00:21:29,830 --> 00:21:27,280
unmanned aerial systems nearby and we're

587
00:21:31,510 --> 00:21:29,840
now reasonably confident that these

588
00:21:33,909 --> 00:21:31,520
triangles correlate to unmanned aerial

589
00:21:35,110 --> 00:21:33,919
systems in the area the triangular

590
00:21:37,270 --> 00:21:35,120
appearance

591
00:21:39,190 --> 00:21:37,280
is a result of light passing through the

592
00:21:41,510 --> 00:21:39,200
night vision goggles and then being

593
00:21:43,270 --> 00:21:41,520
recorded by an slr camera

594
00:21:44,950 --> 00:21:43,280
i don't mean to suggest that everything

595
00:21:48,630 --> 00:21:44,960
that we observe

596
00:21:49,750 --> 00:21:48,640
is is identifiable but

597
00:21:52,149 --> 00:21:49,760
the um

598
00:21:54,950 --> 00:21:52,159
it but this is a great example of how it

599
00:21:56,470 --> 00:21:54,960
takes considerable effort to understand

600
00:21:58,390 --> 00:21:56,480
what we're seeing

601
00:22:00,149 --> 00:21:58,400
in the examples that we are able to

602
00:22:01,430 --> 00:22:00,159
collect um

603
00:22:03,190 --> 00:22:01,440
in this example we accumulated

604
00:22:05,190 --> 00:22:03,200
sufficient data from two similar

605
00:22:07,270 --> 00:22:05,200
encounters from two different time

606
00:22:10,310 --> 00:22:07,280
periods in two different geographic

607
00:22:12,310 --> 00:22:10,320
areas to help us draw these conclusions

608
00:22:15,110 --> 00:22:12,320
that's not always the case though we

609
00:22:17,590 --> 00:22:15,120
recognize that that can be unsatisfying

610
00:22:19,430 --> 00:22:17,600
or insufficient in the eyes of many this

611
00:22:20,630 --> 00:22:19,440
is a popular topic in our nation with

612
00:22:23,430 --> 00:22:20,640
various theories as to what these

613
00:22:24,630 --> 00:22:23,440
objects may be and where they originate

614
00:22:26,070 --> 00:22:24,640
by nature

615
00:22:28,870 --> 00:22:26,080
we are all curious and we seek to

616
00:22:31,510 --> 00:22:28,880
understand the unknown and as a lifelong

617
00:22:33,430 --> 00:22:31,520
intelligence professional i'm impatient

618
00:22:35,110 --> 00:22:33,440
i want immediate explanations for this

619
00:22:36,310 --> 00:22:35,120
as much as anyone else

620
00:22:38,149 --> 00:22:36,320
however

621
00:22:39,590 --> 00:22:38,159
understanding can take significant time

622
00:22:41,990 --> 00:22:39,600
and effort it's why we've endeavored to

623
00:22:44,470 --> 00:22:42,000
concentrate on this data-driven process

624
00:22:45,830 --> 00:22:44,480
to drive fact-based results and given

625
00:22:48,710 --> 00:22:45,840
the nature of our business national

626
00:22:50,710 --> 00:22:48,720
defense we've had to sometimes be less

627
00:22:53,270 --> 00:22:50,720
forthcoming with information in open

628
00:22:55,750 --> 00:22:53,280
forums than many would hope

629
00:22:57,190 --> 00:22:55,760
if uap do indeed represent a potential

630
00:22:59,270 --> 00:22:57,200
threat to our security then the

631
00:23:01,270 --> 00:22:59,280
capabilities systems processes and

632
00:23:03,510 --> 00:23:01,280
sources we use to observe recorded study

633
00:23:05,990 --> 00:23:03,520
or analyze these phenomena need to be

634
00:23:09,190 --> 00:23:06,000
classified at appropriate levels

635
00:23:11,350 --> 00:23:09,200
we do not want we do not want potential

636
00:23:13,669 --> 00:23:11,360
adversaries to know exactly what we're

637
00:23:16,070 --> 00:23:13,679
able to see or understand or how we come

638
00:23:16,950 --> 00:23:16,080
to the conclusions we make therefore

639
00:23:19,190 --> 00:23:16,960
public

640
00:23:21,190 --> 00:23:19,200
disclosures must be carefully considered

641
00:23:23,029 --> 00:23:21,200
on a case-by-case basis

642
00:23:24,470 --> 00:23:23,039
so what's next we're concentrating on a

643
00:23:27,029 --> 00:23:24,480
seamless transition to the new

644
00:23:29,990 --> 00:23:27,039
organization and future analysis of

645
00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:30,000
complicated issues of uap issues will

646
00:23:33,590 --> 00:23:31,520
greatly benefit from the infrastructure

647
00:23:35,190 --> 00:23:33,600
of the process and the procedures that

648
00:23:36,789 --> 00:23:35,200
we've developed to date i'm confident

649
00:23:38,390 --> 00:23:36,799
that the task force under navy

650
00:23:40,390 --> 00:23:38,400
leadership has forged a path forward

651
00:23:41,669 --> 00:23:40,400
that will allow us to anchor assessments

652
00:23:43,830 --> 00:23:41,679
in science and engineering vice

653
00:23:48,070 --> 00:23:43,840
anecdotal evidence we remain committed

654
00:23:50,470 --> 00:23:48,080
to that goal as i know the usdi

655
00:23:51,909 --> 00:23:50,480
organization does as well so thank you

656
00:23:53,430 --> 00:23:51,919
very much for your interest in

657
00:23:55,110 --> 00:23:53,440
continuing support for the uap task

658
00:23:56,710 --> 00:23:55,120
force the team's made a lot of progress

659
00:23:57,750 --> 00:23:56,720
but we really are just establishing the

660
00:23:59,269 --> 00:23:57,760
foundation

661
00:24:00,710 --> 00:23:59,279
for the more detailed analysis that's

662
00:24:02,710 --> 00:24:00,720
yet to be done and with your continued

663
00:24:04,549 --> 00:24:02,720
support we can sustain that momentum

664
00:24:06,310 --> 00:24:04,559
necessary to produce data-centric

665
00:24:07,350 --> 00:24:06,320
analysis and understanding the phenomena

666
00:24:09,510 --> 00:24:07,360
i look forward to your questions thank

667
00:24:11,669 --> 00:24:09,520
you thank you mr bray

668
00:24:13,590 --> 00:24:11,679
this is the third version of this task

669
00:24:16,149 --> 00:24:13,600
force and to be frank

670
00:24:18,390 --> 00:24:16,159
one of congress's concerns is

671
00:24:21,510 --> 00:24:18,400
that the executive branch

672
00:24:24,549 --> 00:24:21,520
in administration from both parties

673
00:24:27,269 --> 00:24:24,559
has been sweeping concerns about uaps

674
00:24:28,710 --> 00:24:27,279
under the rug by focusing on events

675
00:24:30,950 --> 00:24:28,720
that can be explained and avoiding

676
00:24:32,070 --> 00:24:30,960
events that cannot be explained

677
00:24:37,110 --> 00:24:32,080
what can you

678
00:24:40,149 --> 00:24:37,120
the american people

679
00:24:41,750 --> 00:24:40,159
confidence that you aren't just focusing

680
00:24:43,430 --> 00:24:41,760
our attention on

681
00:24:47,830 --> 00:24:43,440
low-hanging fruit with

682
00:24:53,990 --> 00:24:51,110
congressman i'll start and then mr bray

683
00:24:54,870 --> 00:24:54,000
please feel free to uh to weigh in

684
00:24:56,710 --> 00:24:54,880
so

685
00:24:59,029 --> 00:24:56,720
the way that we're approaching is is

686
00:25:01,269 --> 00:24:59,039
with a more

687
00:25:02,549 --> 00:25:01,279
thorough standardized methodology and

688
00:25:03,990 --> 00:25:02,559
what we have in the past first and

689
00:25:06,950 --> 00:25:04,000
foremost the secretary of defense is

690
00:25:08,549 --> 00:25:06,960
chartering this effort this is not uh

691
00:25:11,430 --> 00:25:08,559
someone lower in the department of

692
00:25:13,269 --> 00:25:11,440
defense and he has assigned that task to

693
00:25:15,190 --> 00:25:13,279
the office of secretary of defense uh

694
00:25:17,350 --> 00:25:15,200
the under secretary for intelligence

695
00:25:18,950 --> 00:25:17,360
security that's me because i'm

696
00:25:20,710 --> 00:25:18,960
responsible for looking at intelligence

697
00:25:22,789 --> 00:25:20,720
matters i'm responsible for security

698
00:25:25,190 --> 00:25:22,799
matters this is potentially both

699
00:25:27,269 --> 00:25:25,200
so when you start

700
00:25:28,789 --> 00:25:27,279
concerning the

701
00:25:30,630 --> 00:25:28,799
ourselves with the safety of our

702
00:25:32,710 --> 00:25:30,640
personnel the safety of our

703
00:25:34,630 --> 00:25:32,720
installations and bases there's no other

704
00:25:36,950 --> 00:25:34,640
higher priority than what we have than

705
00:25:38,230 --> 00:25:36,960
actually getting after this and as you

706
00:25:41,750 --> 00:25:38,240
have stated

707
00:25:43,909 --> 00:25:41,760
we have been assigned that task to

708
00:25:45,590 --> 00:25:43,919
actually stand up in office the aim song

709
00:25:46,870 --> 00:25:45,600
which i believe the name sermon will

710
00:25:48,789 --> 00:25:46,880
likely change

711
00:25:52,070 --> 00:25:48,799
but we have moved forward in terms of

712
00:25:54,870 --> 00:25:52,080
moving to establish that office we have

713
00:25:57,350 --> 00:25:54,880
as of this week

714
00:25:59,750 --> 00:25:57,360
pick the director for that effort uh a

715
00:26:02,149 --> 00:25:59,760
very established and um

716
00:26:05,269 --> 00:26:02,159
and uh accomplished individual we've

717
00:26:07,750 --> 00:26:05,279
identified spaces we've uh worked with

718
00:26:09,510 --> 00:26:07,760
personnel across the department of

719
00:26:11,909 --> 00:26:09,520
defense with the services and we've

720
00:26:13,510 --> 00:26:11,919
worked with the ic which is on board in

721
00:26:16,789 --> 00:26:13,520
helping us work through this

722
00:26:19,830 --> 00:26:16,799
standardized methodology for now

723
00:26:22,310 --> 00:26:19,840
bringing in data analyzing that data and

724
00:26:24,070 --> 00:26:22,320
reporting that data in the appropriate

725
00:26:25,430 --> 00:26:24,080
method and appropriate means so we can

726
00:26:27,909 --> 00:26:25,440
either get it

727
00:26:30,310 --> 00:26:27,919
to our service personnel to ensure their

728
00:26:31,909 --> 00:26:30,320
safety or get it to you and the congress

729
00:26:33,750 --> 00:26:31,919
and to the public to ensure that you

730
00:26:35,590 --> 00:26:33,760
have oversight to what we're doing so

731
00:26:38,549 --> 00:26:35,600
chartered by the secretary of defense

732
00:26:40,230 --> 00:26:38,559
standardize and a

733
00:26:41,430 --> 00:26:40,240
really a methodical approach is

734
00:26:43,510 --> 00:26:41,440
something we're doing that has not been

735
00:26:45,350 --> 00:26:43,520
done before can we get some kinds of

736
00:26:47,750 --> 00:26:45,360
assurances that your analysts will

737
00:26:50,789 --> 00:26:47,760
follow the facts where they lead and

738
00:26:52,789 --> 00:26:50,799
assess all hypotheses absolutely so

739
00:26:53,590 --> 00:26:52,799
we're open to all hypotheses we're open

740
00:26:56,310 --> 00:26:53,600
to

741
00:26:57,830 --> 00:26:56,320
any uh conclusions that uh that we may

742
00:26:59,269 --> 00:26:57,840
encounter

743
00:27:01,510 --> 00:26:59,279
uh quickly before i pass it to the

744
00:27:02,390 --> 00:27:01,520
ranking member uh and and chairman

745
00:27:03,830 --> 00:27:02,400
schiff

746
00:27:05,430 --> 00:27:03,840
i want to thank you both for taking the

747
00:27:07,590 --> 00:27:05,440
time and i had a good time meeting with

748
00:27:08,630 --> 00:27:07,600
you last week uh director moultrie under

749
00:27:09,669 --> 00:27:08,640
secretary

750
00:27:12,149 --> 00:27:09,679
moultrie

751
00:27:16,549 --> 00:27:14,470
it's fair to say that you are a science

752
00:27:18,789 --> 00:27:16,559
fiction fan is that correct

753
00:27:22,070 --> 00:27:18,799
it's fair to say that uh i am an

754
00:27:23,830 --> 00:27:22,080
inquisitive mind who has uh spent 40

755
00:27:25,669 --> 00:27:23,840
years in the intelligence field and has

756
00:27:27,350 --> 00:27:25,679
focused on both science and science

757
00:27:29,909 --> 00:27:27,360
fiction that is fair could you tell us

758
00:27:32,070 --> 00:27:29,919
about it yeah well yeah look my

759
00:27:33,750 --> 00:27:32,080
generation grew up

760
00:27:35,909 --> 00:27:33,760
looking at

761
00:27:39,110 --> 00:27:35,919
space sagas and and

762
00:27:41,830 --> 00:27:39,120
the apollo program so all of us who uh

763
00:27:44,230 --> 00:27:41,840
grew up in the 60s uh were were just

764
00:27:45,909 --> 00:27:44,240
thrilled by watching

765
00:27:48,310 --> 00:27:45,919
our first astronaut land on the moon

766
00:27:49,190 --> 00:27:48,320
that was a momentous occasion to people

767
00:27:51,510 --> 00:27:49,200
who

768
00:27:53,110 --> 00:27:51,520
were of different generations uh some of

769
00:27:54,789 --> 00:27:53,120
them didn't believe that happened i

770
00:27:56,230 --> 00:27:54,799
still have relatives and friends who

771
00:27:58,310 --> 00:27:56,240
don't believe it happened right science

772
00:28:00,230 --> 00:27:58,320
fiction to them but to us it was no

773
00:28:01,190 --> 00:28:00,240
that's the progress that we've made

774
00:28:03,350 --> 00:28:01,200
and so

775
00:28:06,470 --> 00:28:03,360
i was enthralled by that and i've taken

776
00:28:09,350 --> 00:28:06,480
that to heart i enjoy um

777
00:28:11,590 --> 00:28:09,360
the challenge of what may be out there i

778
00:28:13,430 --> 00:28:11,600
have mentioned to you that yes i have

779
00:28:14,870 --> 00:28:13,440
followed science fiction i have gone to

780
00:28:18,549 --> 00:28:14,880
conventions even i'll say it on the

781
00:28:20,549 --> 00:28:18,559
record uh uh gotta break the ice somehow

782
00:28:22,630 --> 00:28:20,559
but uh you know i have done that right

783
00:28:25,350 --> 00:28:22,640
but there's nothing wrong with that um

784
00:28:26,870 --> 00:28:25,360
don't necessarily dress up but i do uh

785
00:28:28,789 --> 00:28:26,880
you know i do believe that it's

786
00:28:30,549 --> 00:28:28,799
important to show that the department of

787
00:28:32,389 --> 00:28:30,559
defense has um you know we have

788
00:28:34,549 --> 00:28:32,399
character and we're people just like you

789
00:28:37,590 --> 00:28:34,559
just like the american people we have

790
00:28:39,669 --> 00:28:37,600
our um we have our uh

791
00:28:41,510 --> 00:28:39,679
our inquisitiveness uh we have our

792
00:28:43,029 --> 00:28:41,520
questions we want to know what's out

793
00:28:44,950 --> 00:28:43,039
there as much as you want to know what's

794
00:28:46,470 --> 00:28:44,960
out there we get the questions not just

795
00:28:48,470 --> 00:28:46,480
from you we get it from family members

796
00:28:50,230 --> 00:28:48,480
and we get them night and day

797
00:28:51,909 --> 00:28:50,240
not just in committee hearings so

798
00:28:53,669 --> 00:28:51,919
finding what's out there is important

799
00:28:55,669 --> 00:28:53,679
but first and fore and foremost it's

800
00:28:58,070 --> 00:28:55,679
important for us to do that so we can

801
00:29:00,389 --> 00:28:58,080
ensure that our people our personnel our

802
00:29:01,750 --> 00:29:00,399
aviators our bases and installations are

803
00:29:03,590 --> 00:29:01,760
safe

804
00:29:05,510 --> 00:29:03,600
and then that curiosity factor is

805
00:29:07,669 --> 00:29:05,520
something else that that we just want to

806
00:29:09,590 --> 00:29:07,679
know because that's the human race it's

807
00:29:12,070 --> 00:29:09,600
just you know that insatiable desire to

808
00:29:15,029 --> 00:29:12,080
know

809
00:29:17,430 --> 00:29:15,039
thank you sir thank you member crawford

810
00:29:20,710 --> 00:29:17,440
mr melter you said you don't necessarily

811
00:29:25,669 --> 00:29:23,360
that wasn't a real strong statement

812
00:29:27,269 --> 00:29:25,679
[Laughter]

813
00:29:29,350 --> 00:29:27,279
gentlemen thank you for being here today

814
00:29:30,950 --> 00:29:29,360
we appreciate it um

815
00:29:33,110 --> 00:29:30,960
and thank you mr mulder for breaking the

816
00:29:35,110 --> 00:29:33,120
ice the way you did appreciate that the

817
00:29:36,470 --> 00:29:35,120
inability to understand objects in our

818
00:29:38,070 --> 00:29:36,480
sensitive

819
00:29:39,909 --> 00:29:38,080
operating areas is tantamount to an

820
00:29:41,909 --> 00:29:39,919
intelligence failure that we certainly

821
00:29:43,830 --> 00:29:41,919
want to avoid this is not about finding

822
00:29:45,269 --> 00:29:43,840
alien spacecraft but about delivering

823
00:29:46,870 --> 00:29:45,279
dominant intelligence across the

824
00:29:48,230 --> 00:29:46,880
tactical operational and strategic

825
00:29:50,470 --> 00:29:48,240
spectrum

826
00:29:54,789 --> 00:29:50,480
so my question is how can amesog lead to

827
00:29:59,669 --> 00:29:57,350
sure i'll start with that uh so the goal

828
00:30:01,669 --> 00:29:59,679
of our effort is to integrate it into

829
00:30:04,630 --> 00:30:01,679
what we already do on a normal basis

830
00:30:05,909 --> 00:30:04,640
which is look for the unknown unknowns

831
00:30:08,149 --> 00:30:05,919
congressman as you stated in your

832
00:30:09,590 --> 00:30:08,159
opening remarks across all domains so

833
00:30:11,990 --> 00:30:09,600
we've been doing this for decades we've

834
00:30:13,909 --> 00:30:12,000
been looking at the space domain looking

835
00:30:16,149 --> 00:30:13,919
at space objects looking at space

836
00:30:17,990 --> 00:30:16,159
weather looking at space phenomena

837
00:30:20,549 --> 00:30:18,000
we've been looking at things in the air

838
00:30:22,149 --> 00:30:20,559
domain and we as you know we and i'll

839
00:30:24,149 --> 00:30:22,159
talk more about this and classified

840
00:30:26,710 --> 00:30:24,159
session but we have a very concerted

841
00:30:28,789 --> 00:30:26,720
effort to understand adversarial

842
00:30:30,549 --> 00:30:28,799
platforms and adversarial developmental

843
00:30:31,750 --> 00:30:30,559
programs and we do that also in the

844
00:30:34,230 --> 00:30:31,760
ground domain and of course we're very

845
00:30:36,470 --> 00:30:34,240
interested in what happens in the uh

846
00:30:39,190 --> 00:30:36,480
in the underwater or c domain if you

847
00:30:41,310 --> 00:30:39,200
will subsurface domain so if there are

848
00:30:44,549 --> 00:30:41,320
objects that our

849
00:30:49,510 --> 00:30:44,559
aviators or air crews are encountering

850
00:30:51,510 --> 00:30:49,520
in this air domain and their sensors are

851
00:30:53,669 --> 00:30:51,520
are discovering or detecting some of

852
00:30:56,230 --> 00:30:53,679
these objects we want to just bring that

853
00:30:58,230 --> 00:30:56,240
in to the normal process that we have

854
00:30:59,669 --> 00:30:58,240
for identifying unknown unknowns we want

855
00:31:01,830 --> 00:30:59,679
to make sure we have the intelligence

856
00:31:04,070 --> 00:31:01,840
requirements that allow us not only to

857
00:31:06,950 --> 00:31:04,080
look at that event from the time that it

858
00:31:08,630 --> 00:31:06,960
occurs forward but maybe retrospectively

859
00:31:10,389 --> 00:31:08,640
we want to go back and see if we can get

860
00:31:12,310 --> 00:31:10,399
to the left of that event to say was

861
00:31:14,070 --> 00:31:12,320
there some developmental program

862
00:31:15,269 --> 00:31:14,080
that we to get to your technical

863
00:31:16,950 --> 00:31:15,279
surprise

864
00:31:19,669 --> 00:31:16,960
issue sir that we should have known

865
00:31:21,110 --> 00:31:19,679
about and if so how do we put that

866
00:31:23,990 --> 00:31:21,120
intelligence requirement in place to

867
00:31:25,990 --> 00:31:24,000
ensure that we are following an

868
00:31:27,830 --> 00:31:26,000
adversarial development or any other

869
00:31:29,750 --> 00:31:27,840
development that may be out there so

870
00:31:31,350 --> 00:31:29,760
that's what we we want to do in terms of

871
00:31:33,350 --> 00:31:31,360
normalizing this and bringing it into

872
00:31:34,789 --> 00:31:33,360
the normal process of how we identify

873
00:31:36,630 --> 00:31:34,799
unknown unknowns

874
00:31:37,990 --> 00:31:36,640
so you mentioned fidelity and i think

875
00:31:40,549 --> 00:31:38,000
it's important to

876
00:31:43,830 --> 00:31:40,559
talk about the relationship

877
00:31:47,350 --> 00:31:43,840
from the navy is the lead agency on this

878
00:31:49,590 --> 00:31:47,360
how do you interact with space force air

879
00:31:51,110 --> 00:31:49,600
force to create that degree of fidelity

880
00:31:52,230 --> 00:31:51,120
we're talking about sensors and so on

881
00:31:53,830 --> 00:31:52,240
and i guess

882
00:31:55,509 --> 00:31:53,840
where i have some concerns that many of

883
00:31:57,830 --> 00:31:55,519
the images that we see

884
00:31:59,350 --> 00:31:57,840
commonly

885
00:32:02,070 --> 00:31:59,360
in this committee and even in open

886
00:32:04,310 --> 00:32:02,080
source the resolution and the clarity

887
00:32:06,310 --> 00:32:04,320
that would allow a robust technical

888
00:32:07,350 --> 00:32:06,320
intelligence analysis is

889
00:32:09,269 --> 00:32:07,360
challenging

890
00:32:11,029 --> 00:32:09,279
so is aimshot

891
00:32:13,190 --> 00:32:11,039
prepared to address the quality and

892
00:32:14,789 --> 00:32:13,200
quantity of data collected on uap to

893
00:32:16,870 --> 00:32:14,799
advance intelligence collection and do

894
00:32:19,350 --> 00:32:16,880
you have the adequate sensors you need

895
00:32:21,110 --> 00:32:19,360
to collect that high quality data

896
00:32:23,110 --> 00:32:21,120
one of the lines of effort that we have

897
00:32:25,909 --> 00:32:23,120
is looking at our sensor capabilities

898
00:32:28,630 --> 00:32:25,919
and to understand whether or not

899
00:32:30,149 --> 00:32:28,640
the video showed that mr bray

900
00:32:32,230 --> 00:32:30,159
displayed

901
00:32:33,750 --> 00:32:32,240
sometimes it's very fleeting

902
00:32:35,830 --> 00:32:33,760
data that we have on some of these

903
00:32:37,190 --> 00:32:35,840
objects and and we want to make sure

904
00:32:39,110 --> 00:32:37,200
that one

905
00:32:41,190 --> 00:32:39,120
our systems are calibrated

906
00:32:42,950 --> 00:32:41,200
to actually be able to collect on the

907
00:32:45,269 --> 00:32:42,960
objects you know our sensors today are

908
00:32:47,269 --> 00:32:45,279
they're calibrated for specific things

909
00:32:48,789 --> 00:32:47,279
we want to make sure to calibrate it for

910
00:32:51,110 --> 00:32:48,799
things of this nature things of this

911
00:32:53,430 --> 00:32:51,120
size things of this velocity if i can

912
00:32:55,669 --> 00:32:53,440
use that term we want to make sure that

913
00:32:58,389 --> 00:32:55,679
once we have that that that data is

914
00:33:00,389 --> 00:32:58,399
stored in some standardized method that

915
00:33:02,310 --> 00:33:00,399
we can then extract and that we can feed

916
00:33:04,710 --> 00:33:02,320
into our system real time so we do not

917
00:33:06,149 --> 00:33:04,720
like want this to take some uh prolonged

918
00:33:09,269 --> 00:33:06,159
period of time for us to get that data

919
00:33:11,190 --> 00:33:09,279
but our goal is absolutely to have that

920
00:33:12,710 --> 00:33:11,200
high fidelity information that we get

921
00:33:14,789 --> 00:33:12,720
from all sensors and we want to be able

922
00:33:16,710 --> 00:33:14,799
to integrate that with what we may have

923
00:33:17,990 --> 00:33:16,720
off a ground-based sensor so whatever

924
00:33:19,750 --> 00:33:18,000
you may have on a platform whatever we

925
00:33:20,549 --> 00:33:19,760
may have on the ground whatever we may

926
00:33:21,590 --> 00:33:20,559
have

927
00:33:23,430 --> 00:33:21,600
from

928
00:33:24,789 --> 00:33:23,440
other sensors that we may have in

929
00:33:25,990 --> 00:33:24,799
different domains we want to be able to

930
00:33:28,149 --> 00:33:26,000
integrate that all and get this

931
00:33:30,070 --> 00:33:28,159
integrated picture as we would as i said

932
00:33:31,590 --> 00:33:30,080
with any other unidentified objects or

933
00:33:33,110 --> 00:33:31,600
things that we are tracking

934
00:33:34,789 --> 00:33:33,120
as a part of our normal intelligence

935
00:33:36,389 --> 00:33:34,799
responsibilities

936
00:33:39,750 --> 00:33:36,399
thank you last question mr bray if you

937
00:33:41,669 --> 00:33:39,760
would uh i'm a navy pilot i've

938
00:33:43,269 --> 00:33:41,679
encountered a uap walk me through the

939
00:33:45,590 --> 00:33:43,279
reporting protocol

940
00:33:47,269 --> 00:33:45,600
um once i see something that i think

941
00:33:48,230 --> 00:33:47,279
needs reported

942
00:33:50,389 --> 00:33:48,240
uh

943
00:33:52,310 --> 00:33:50,399
the first thing that aviator would do

944
00:33:54,310 --> 00:33:52,320
after landing as a part of their normal

945
00:33:56,549 --> 00:33:54,320
uh debriefing is they would uh

946
00:33:58,310 --> 00:33:56,559
contact their uh intelligence officer

947
00:34:00,870 --> 00:33:58,320
their intelligence officer would then uh

948
00:34:03,269 --> 00:34:00,880
walk them through uh first filing a

949
00:34:06,310 --> 00:34:03,279
first actually data preservation doing

950
00:34:08,149 --> 00:34:06,320
to ensure that that whatever sensor data

951
00:34:10,230 --> 00:34:08,159
may be on the aircraft that we preserve

952
00:34:12,710 --> 00:34:10,240
that so that it's available for for

953
00:34:15,909 --> 00:34:12,720
later analysis um second they would

954
00:34:17,510 --> 00:34:15,919
actually fill out a a form uh that that

955
00:34:19,270 --> 00:34:17,520
includes details like where they were

956
00:34:21,589 --> 00:34:19,280
operating altitudes their operating

957
00:34:23,750 --> 00:34:21,599
speeds what they observed

958
00:34:25,510 --> 00:34:23,760
whatever sense of data sensor data they

959
00:34:28,389 --> 00:34:25,520
may have recorded from that

960
00:34:30,869 --> 00:34:28,399
and then that report is filed it goes

961
00:34:32,869 --> 00:34:30,879
two places one it goes through

962
00:34:34,629 --> 00:34:32,879
through the operational

963
00:34:36,710 --> 00:34:34,639
chain of command so that operational

964
00:34:38,790 --> 00:34:36,720
units are aware of what uh what's being

965
00:34:41,430 --> 00:34:38,800
observed and also

966
00:34:44,869 --> 00:34:41,440
to the uap task force so that they can

967
00:34:47,589 --> 00:34:44,879
take that data uh database it and

968
00:34:50,790 --> 00:34:47,599
quite often uh have individuals from the

969
00:34:52,149 --> 00:34:50,800
task force uh contact the aviator uh and

970
00:34:54,149 --> 00:34:52,159
ask them additional questions if there

971
00:34:56,629 --> 00:34:54,159
were things that weren't clear uh in the

972
00:34:59,510 --> 00:34:56,639
uh in the report uh that thing goes into

973
00:35:02,069 --> 00:34:59,520
a um uh into a database uh where we

974
00:35:03,670 --> 00:35:02,079
begin to compare it with other

975
00:35:06,230 --> 00:35:03,680
observations that we have again

976
00:35:09,270 --> 00:35:06,240
comparing for locations comparing for

977
00:35:11,190 --> 00:35:09,280
altitude speeds shapes

978
00:35:12,470 --> 00:35:11,200
if any rf emissions were detected from

979
00:35:14,310 --> 00:35:12,480
the platform

980
00:35:16,310 --> 00:35:14,320
all of that so that we can try to reach

981
00:35:17,990 --> 00:35:16,320
some conclusions on that thank you

982
00:35:20,069 --> 00:35:18,000
you're back

983
00:35:22,150 --> 00:35:20,079
gentleman yields back chairmanship

984
00:35:24,790 --> 00:35:22,160
thanks chairman um mr break can you

985
00:35:27,349 --> 00:35:24,800
rerun that first image that looked like

986
00:35:29,190 --> 00:35:27,359
it was outside of a plane window

987
00:35:31,190 --> 00:35:29,200
and if you wouldn't mind going up to the

988
00:35:33,349 --> 00:35:31,200
screen and tell us what we're

989
00:35:34,790 --> 00:35:33,359
what we're seeing

990
00:35:36,550 --> 00:35:34,800
not that you can necessarily tell us

991
00:35:38,310 --> 00:35:36,560
what we're seeing but right explain what

992
00:35:41,109 --> 00:35:38,320
we should be looking at in that first

993
00:35:44,069 --> 00:35:41,119
image absolutely uh and alexi what i'll

994
00:36:14,150 --> 00:35:44,079
ask is if you can stop it at a certain

995
00:36:18,069 --> 00:36:16,470
and are we looking outside of a civilian

996
00:36:21,829 --> 00:36:18,079
aircraft window is that what we're

997
00:36:21,839 --> 00:36:30,310
okay

998
00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:49,990
is

999
00:36:50,000 --> 00:37:04,150
yes

1000
00:37:04,160 --> 00:37:08,310
as you can see

1001
00:37:12,310 --> 00:37:10,470
um what you'll find uh eventually on

1002
00:37:15,829 --> 00:37:12,320
this when we find the right frame is for

1003
00:37:18,230 --> 00:37:15,839
literally about one frame here is a

1004
00:37:20,790 --> 00:37:18,240
spherical object

1005
00:37:33,829 --> 00:37:20,800
that passes uh right through here

1006
00:38:16,790 --> 00:37:35,349
can you point to the screen again what

1007
00:38:36,310 --> 00:38:19,430
okay if you could stop that frame

1008
00:38:36,320 --> 00:38:42,870
alexa just push play let's see

1009
00:38:46,710 --> 00:38:44,470
here's what you'll see coming up right

1010
00:38:49,190 --> 00:38:46,720
here is that there went now back up just

1011
00:38:53,349 --> 00:38:51,750
spherical object right here zooms by the

1012
00:38:59,109 --> 00:38:53,359
window uh

1013
00:39:02,870 --> 00:39:01,349
there we go

1014
00:39:04,069 --> 00:39:02,880
did you see that part right there again

1015
00:39:07,750 --> 00:39:04,079
going by i think we're having a hard

1016
00:39:07,760 --> 00:39:16,470
all right

1017
00:39:16,480 --> 00:39:23,030
okay so as you can see it's difficult

1018
00:39:27,030 --> 00:39:25,430
um the laptop we're working with uh is

1019
00:39:28,790 --> 00:39:27,040
not as easy for us stopping that video

1020
00:39:31,589 --> 00:39:28,800
in the right spot we'll describe what

1021
00:39:34,950 --> 00:39:31,599
what we have seen in that uh what are we

1022
00:39:35,750 --> 00:39:34,960
observing uh what you see here uh is um

1023
00:39:46,230 --> 00:39:35,760
uh

1024
00:39:47,670 --> 00:39:46,240
observed a spherical object

1025
00:39:49,589 --> 00:39:47,680
in that area

1026
00:39:51,670 --> 00:39:49,599
and as they fly by it they take a video

1027
00:39:53,829 --> 00:39:51,680
you see a

1028
00:39:55,349 --> 00:39:53,839
it looks uh reflective in this video

1029
00:39:57,670 --> 00:39:55,359
somewhat reflective

1030
00:40:00,710 --> 00:39:57,680
and it quickly passes by

1031
00:40:02,950 --> 00:40:00,720
uh the cockpit of the uh of the aircraft

1032
00:40:04,710 --> 00:40:02,960
and is this one of the phenomena that we

1033
00:40:07,270 --> 00:40:04,720
can't explain i do not have an

1034
00:40:09,190 --> 00:40:07,280
explanation for what this

1035
00:40:11,190 --> 00:40:09,200
this specific uh

1036
00:40:13,589 --> 00:40:11,200
object is and is this one of the

1037
00:40:14,870 --> 00:40:13,599
situations where it is

1038
00:40:17,030 --> 00:40:14,880
that's that's the object that we're

1039
00:40:18,150 --> 00:40:17,040
looking at right there thank you

1040
00:40:20,550 --> 00:40:18,160
um

1041
00:40:22,309 --> 00:40:20,560
and is this a situation where

1042
00:40:24,230 --> 00:40:22,319
it was observed by the pilot and it was

1043
00:40:25,910 --> 00:40:24,240
also recorded by the aircraft's

1044
00:40:28,150 --> 00:40:25,920
instruments

1045
00:40:33,349 --> 00:40:28,160
we'll talk about the multi-sensor part

1046
00:40:36,829 --> 00:40:35,270
but in this case

1047
00:40:39,670 --> 00:40:36,839
we have at least

1048
00:40:41,589 --> 00:40:39,680
that um in in the

1049
00:40:44,309 --> 00:40:41,599
director of national intelligence uh

1050
00:40:48,230 --> 00:40:44,319
2021 unclassified report

1051
00:40:52,309 --> 00:40:48,240
um the odni reported 144

1052
00:40:55,270 --> 00:40:52,319
uaps between 2004 and 2021

1053
00:40:56,950 --> 00:40:55,280
uh 80 of which were uh recorded on

1054
00:40:57,990 --> 00:40:56,960
multiple instruments

1055
00:40:59,910 --> 00:40:58,000
um

1056
00:41:01,030 --> 00:40:59,920
and i take it with respect to some of

1057
00:41:03,349 --> 00:41:01,040
those

1058
00:41:05,750 --> 00:41:03,359
you had the pilot a pilot seeing them it

1059
00:41:07,670 --> 00:41:05,760
was observed by a pilot and you had

1060
00:41:09,270 --> 00:41:07,680
multiple instruments recording it so you

1061
00:41:11,190 --> 00:41:09,280
really have three sensors the human

1062
00:41:12,870 --> 00:41:11,200
sensor and two

1063
00:41:14,950 --> 00:41:12,880
technical uh

1064
00:41:18,630 --> 00:41:14,960
sensors detecting the object is that for

1065
00:41:20,950 --> 00:41:18,640
them for the majority of uh

1066
00:41:23,589 --> 00:41:20,960
incidents that we had in the uh

1067
00:41:26,710 --> 00:41:23,599
last year's report uh the majority had

1068
00:41:28,950 --> 00:41:26,720
multi-sensor data uh when i talk about

1069
00:41:30,230 --> 00:41:28,960
the 400 reports that we have now

1070
00:41:31,990 --> 00:41:30,240
that number will certainly go down

1071
00:41:33,510 --> 00:41:32,000
because a lot of those

1072
00:41:35,270 --> 00:41:33,520
new reports that we have are actually

1073
00:41:37,990 --> 00:41:35,280
historic reports that are narrative

1074
00:41:40,870 --> 00:41:38,000
based so that percentage will go down

1075
00:41:42,710 --> 00:41:40,880
just as a factor of uh the fact that the

1076
00:41:44,470 --> 00:41:42,720
that the destigmatization has resulted

1077
00:41:45,910 --> 00:41:44,480
in more narrative reports and that's the

1078
00:41:51,510 --> 00:41:45,920
object we're looking at right there now

1079
00:41:57,750 --> 00:41:53,829
last year's report also said that of

1080
00:41:59,910 --> 00:41:57,760
those 144 18 of them

1081
00:42:00,829 --> 00:41:59,920
reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual

1082
00:42:02,790 --> 00:42:00,839
flight

1083
00:42:05,510 --> 00:42:02,800
characteristics appear to demonstrate

1084
00:42:06,630 --> 00:42:05,520
advanced technology

1085
00:42:08,710 --> 00:42:06,640
and

1086
00:42:10,870 --> 00:42:08,720
some of them appear to remain stationary

1087
00:42:12,470 --> 00:42:10,880
in winds aloft move against the wind

1088
00:42:14,230 --> 00:42:12,480
maneuver abruptly or move at

1089
00:42:17,430 --> 00:42:14,240
considerable speed without discernible

1090
00:42:21,990 --> 00:42:17,440
means of propulsion

1091
00:42:25,430 --> 00:42:23,910
and if you're able to answer this in

1092
00:42:29,270 --> 00:42:25,440
this setting

1093
00:42:32,309 --> 00:42:29,280
are we aware of any uh foreign adversary

1094
00:42:33,910 --> 00:42:32,319
capable of moving objects

1095
00:42:35,829 --> 00:42:33,920
without any discernible means of

1096
00:42:37,589 --> 00:42:35,839
propulsion

1097
00:42:39,670 --> 00:42:37,599
um

1098
00:42:41,990 --> 00:42:39,680
i think i would without discernible

1099
00:42:44,069 --> 00:42:42,000
means of propulsion i would say that

1100
00:42:45,829 --> 00:42:44,079
we're not aware of any adversary that

1101
00:42:47,750 --> 00:42:45,839
can move an object without discernible

1102
00:42:49,750 --> 00:42:47,760
means of propulsion

1103
00:42:51,270 --> 00:42:49,760
the question then becomes in many of

1104
00:42:53,510 --> 00:42:51,280
these cases where we don't have a

1105
00:42:55,349 --> 00:42:53,520
discernible mean of propulsion in the

1106
00:42:57,190 --> 00:42:55,359
data that we have

1107
00:43:00,390 --> 00:42:57,200
in some cases

1108
00:43:01,349 --> 00:43:00,400
um there is likely sensor artifacts uh

1109
00:43:06,309 --> 00:43:01,359
that

1110
00:43:07,990 --> 00:43:06,319
there's certainly some degree of uh of

1111
00:43:09,910 --> 00:43:08,000
something that looks like signature

1112
00:43:11,829 --> 00:43:09,920
management that we have seen from some

1113
00:43:13,510 --> 00:43:11,839
of these uh

1114
00:43:15,990 --> 00:43:13,520
uap

1115
00:43:18,309 --> 00:43:16,000
but i would i would caution i would

1116
00:43:20,470 --> 00:43:18,319
simply say that there are a number of uh

1117
00:43:22,309 --> 00:43:20,480
of events in which we do not have an

1118
00:43:24,630 --> 00:43:22,319
explanation in which then there are a

1119
00:43:26,710 --> 00:43:24,640
small handful in which there are flight

1120
00:43:29,589 --> 00:43:26,720
characteristics or signature management

1121
00:43:30,630 --> 00:43:29,599
um that we can't explain with the data

1122
00:43:32,390 --> 00:43:30,640
that we have

1123
00:43:34,790 --> 00:43:32,400
um we'll continue those are obviously

1124
00:43:36,710 --> 00:43:34,800
the ones that are of most interest to us

1125
00:43:39,030 --> 00:43:36,720
earlier when we asked about how you

1126
00:43:40,790 --> 00:43:39,040
avoid technological surprise the biggest

1127
00:43:42,790 --> 00:43:40,800
way you avoid technological surprises by

1128
00:43:44,230 --> 00:43:42,800
collecting this type of data and by

1129
00:43:46,069 --> 00:43:44,240
importantly

1130
00:43:48,870 --> 00:43:46,079
calibrating the assumptions that you go

1131
00:43:50,470 --> 00:43:48,880
into with how you do that analysis i'll

1132
00:43:51,430 --> 00:43:50,480
tell you within the uap task force we

1133
00:43:54,150 --> 00:43:51,440
have

1134
00:43:56,390 --> 00:43:54,160
one basic assumption and that is that

1135
00:43:59,430 --> 00:43:56,400
generally speaking generally speaking

1136
00:44:01,270 --> 00:43:59,440
our sensors operate as designed

1137
00:44:03,829 --> 00:44:01,280
and we make that assumption because many

1138
00:44:06,150 --> 00:44:03,839
times these are multi-sensor collections

1139
00:44:08,230 --> 00:44:06,160
we make no assumptions about the origin

1140
00:44:09,910 --> 00:44:08,240
of this or that there may or may not be

1141
00:44:11,910 --> 00:44:09,920
some sort of technology that we don't

1142
00:44:13,750 --> 00:44:11,920
understand that's i think the key to

1143
00:44:15,670 --> 00:44:13,760
avoiding technological surprises by

1144
00:44:18,230 --> 00:44:15,680
calibrating those assumptions

1145
00:44:20,870 --> 00:44:18,240
and finally um with respect to the

1146
00:44:23,430 --> 00:44:20,880
second two videos uh showing the

1147
00:44:26,550 --> 00:44:23,440
small triangles

1148
00:44:27,349 --> 00:44:26,560
the hypothesis is that those are

1149
00:44:31,829 --> 00:44:27,359
uh

1150
00:44:33,510 --> 00:44:31,839
use of night vision goggles appear like

1151
00:44:35,910 --> 00:44:33,520
triangles is that the

1152
00:44:38,390 --> 00:44:35,920
operating assessment some type of uh of

1153
00:44:41,109 --> 00:44:38,400
drone uh some type of unmanned aerial

1154
00:44:44,470 --> 00:44:41,119
system uh and it is simply that that

1155
00:44:46,550 --> 00:44:44,480
light source uh resolves itself through

1156
00:44:49,829 --> 00:44:46,560
the um through the night vision goggles

1157
00:44:51,510 --> 00:44:49,839
onto the slr camera as a triangle and

1158
00:44:54,470 --> 00:44:51,520
have we in order to prove that

1159
00:44:56,790 --> 00:44:54,480
hypothesis uh flown

1160
00:44:59,270 --> 00:44:56,800
a drone uh and observed it with that

1161
00:45:01,589 --> 00:44:59,280
same technology to see whether we can

1162
00:45:03,270 --> 00:45:01,599
reproduce the effect the uap task force

1163
00:45:07,109 --> 00:45:03,280
is aware of studies that have done that

1164
00:45:09,589 --> 00:45:07,119
okay thank you mr chairman i yield back

1165
00:45:11,190 --> 00:45:09,599
the gentleman yields back

1166
00:45:13,109 --> 00:45:11,200
dr winstrom

1167
00:45:15,349 --> 00:45:13,119
thank you mr chairman thank you all for

1168
00:45:17,030 --> 00:45:15,359
being here um

1169
00:45:19,030 --> 00:45:17,040
my first question is

1170
00:45:20,630 --> 00:45:19,040
through this process where there's been

1171
00:45:25,910 --> 00:45:20,640
sightings

1172
00:45:28,870 --> 00:45:25,920
have they always been

1173
00:45:31,190 --> 00:45:28,880
cited from a moving object

1174
00:45:32,390 --> 00:45:31,200
from a plane or a ship that may be

1175
00:45:34,309 --> 00:45:32,400
moving

1176
00:45:36,230 --> 00:45:34,319
have these reports ever come from a

1177
00:45:37,670 --> 00:45:36,240
stationary object

1178
00:45:39,190 --> 00:45:37,680
being observed

1179
00:45:41,990 --> 00:45:39,200
in the sky

1180
00:45:44,069 --> 00:45:42,000
the uap task force does have uh reports

1181
00:45:45,990 --> 00:45:44,079
from stationary

1182
00:45:47,990 --> 00:45:46,000
from state reports from a stationary

1183
00:45:49,510 --> 00:45:48,000
observer okay there's a difference in

1184
00:45:51,430 --> 00:45:49,520
observing something when you're moving

1185
00:45:53,109 --> 00:45:51,440
as well it's it's physics right that's

1186
00:45:54,069 --> 00:45:53,119
why i asked that question

1187
00:45:56,230 --> 00:45:54,079
uh

1188
00:45:57,910 --> 00:45:56,240
are we capable or have we made any

1189
00:45:59,910 --> 00:45:57,920
breakthroughs or anyone made any

1190
00:46:00,870 --> 00:45:59,920
breakthroughs to be able to site

1191
00:46:04,309 --> 00:46:00,880
something

1192
00:46:07,190 --> 00:46:04,319
and make some determination at all

1193
00:46:09,109 --> 00:46:07,200
of its composition whether it's a solid

1194
00:46:14,230 --> 00:46:09,119
or a gas

1195
00:46:18,309 --> 00:46:15,910
um

1196
00:46:19,829 --> 00:46:18,319
from not asking what i just right from

1197
00:46:22,550 --> 00:46:19,839
some of the returns i mean it's clear

1198
00:46:24,069 --> 00:46:22,560
that uh that the majority well it's

1199
00:46:26,309 --> 00:46:24,079
clear that many of the observations we

1200
00:46:29,349 --> 00:46:26,319
have are physical objects uh from the

1201
00:46:31,270 --> 00:46:29,359
the sensor data that we have

1202
00:46:33,589 --> 00:46:31,280
well gas is physical as a physical

1203
00:46:35,270 --> 00:46:33,599
object it can be and so

1204
00:46:36,710 --> 00:46:35,280
and you see where i'm going with this

1205
00:46:38,230 --> 00:46:36,720
i'm trying to determine what it is we're

1206
00:46:40,870 --> 00:46:38,240
looking at so if we can decide if

1207
00:46:43,030 --> 00:46:40,880
something is a solid or a gas and and if

1208
00:46:46,309 --> 00:46:43,040
there been any conclusion on its

1209
00:46:49,829 --> 00:46:46,319
capabilities like its capabilities of

1210
00:46:52,790 --> 00:46:49,839
movement uh of turning uh going you know

1211
00:46:54,470 --> 00:46:52,800
180 degrees or 90 degree turn anything

1212
00:46:56,950 --> 00:46:54,480
along that line that we've been able to

1213
00:46:58,630 --> 00:46:56,960
determine um within the and again i

1214
00:47:00,790 --> 00:46:58,640
should point out that uh you know that

1215
00:47:02,630 --> 00:47:00,800
there is not a single explanation for

1216
00:47:04,790 --> 00:47:02,640
uap they are make up there are a lot of

1217
00:47:07,030 --> 00:47:04,800
different things uh that that are

1218
00:47:09,190 --> 00:47:07,040
unidentified phenomena basically

1219
00:47:11,109 --> 00:47:09,200
we really don't know much on that that's

1220
00:47:12,870 --> 00:47:11,119
that's all i'm trying to get we i'm

1221
00:47:15,109 --> 00:47:12,880
pleased that you have protocol right now

1222
00:47:17,670 --> 00:47:15,119
for our military but are there

1223
00:47:19,829 --> 00:47:17,680
any non-military reports coming forward

1224
00:47:21,349 --> 00:47:19,839
of similar events or is it all coming

1225
00:47:22,790 --> 00:47:21,359
from military

1226
00:47:25,270 --> 00:47:22,800
the uap task force has a very good

1227
00:47:26,710 --> 00:47:25,280
working relationship with the faa uh

1228
00:47:29,109 --> 00:47:26,720
they have very good working relationship

1229
00:47:32,390 --> 00:47:29,119
with other parts of the us government so

1230
00:47:35,829 --> 00:47:32,400
that we can ingest reports uh from um

1231
00:47:37,910 --> 00:47:35,839
do we have any reports non-military

1232
00:47:38,790 --> 00:47:37,920
yes thank you that's that's that's my

1233
00:47:41,270 --> 00:47:38,800
question

1234
00:47:43,510 --> 00:47:41,280
um and do we need to put out protocol

1235
00:47:45,430 --> 00:47:43,520
for civilians that may be in that arena

1236
00:47:47,270 --> 00:47:45,440
like through faa do you think that would

1237
00:47:50,069 --> 00:47:47,280
be appropriate and helpful

1238
00:47:53,270 --> 00:47:50,079
i think standardized reporting without a

1239
00:47:56,069 --> 00:47:53,280
doubt is key to helping us get to the to

1240
00:47:59,349 --> 00:47:56,079
ascertain what some of these are i think

1241
00:48:01,990 --> 00:47:59,359
it would be important as well do we um

1242
00:48:04,309 --> 00:48:02,000
there are other people besides uh the

1243
00:48:06,630 --> 00:48:04,319
u.s that have had these experiences and

1244
00:48:09,750 --> 00:48:06,640
reported them is that correct

1245
00:48:10,710 --> 00:48:09,760
there are that's correct uh is it uh all

1246
00:48:13,589 --> 00:48:10,720
of our

1247
00:48:15,750 --> 00:48:13,599
allies or is it allies and adversaries

1248
00:48:17,589 --> 00:48:15,760
what have we learned publicly so some of

1249
00:48:19,109 --> 00:48:17,599
that i think sir we'll say for closed

1250
00:48:21,430 --> 00:48:19,119
session

1251
00:48:22,950 --> 00:48:21,440
well that goes my next question publicly

1252
00:48:24,790 --> 00:48:22,960
have others

1253
00:48:26,790 --> 00:48:24,800
made anything which would not

1254
00:48:28,309 --> 00:48:26,800
have to be considered closed so i don't

1255
00:48:30,069 --> 00:48:28,319
want you to answer what they've said

1256
00:48:32,390 --> 00:48:30,079
necessarily

1257
00:48:34,710 --> 00:48:32,400
allies have uh have seen these china has

1258
00:48:36,790 --> 00:48:34,720
established its own version of a uap

1259
00:48:39,349 --> 00:48:36,800
task force so clearly a number of

1260
00:48:40,710 --> 00:48:39,359
countries have observations of

1261
00:48:43,030 --> 00:48:40,720
of things in the airspace that they

1262
00:48:46,470 --> 00:48:43,040
can't identify and

1263
00:48:49,910 --> 00:48:46,480
do we share data with some with all

1264
00:48:53,109 --> 00:48:51,510
we share data with some and some share

1265
00:48:54,950 --> 00:48:53,119
data with us

1266
00:48:56,710 --> 00:48:54,960
but not necessarily all that have

1267
00:48:57,589 --> 00:48:56,720
publicly reported something that's

1268
00:48:58,390 --> 00:48:57,599
correct

1269
00:48:59,670 --> 00:48:58,400
okay

1270
00:49:00,950 --> 00:48:59,680
um

1271
00:49:02,549 --> 00:49:00,960
and i think that's

1272
00:49:04,309 --> 00:49:02,559
an important thing and for the other

1273
00:49:05,510 --> 00:49:04,319
session actually that we we don't

1274
00:49:07,750 --> 00:49:05,520
discuss

1275
00:49:09,750 --> 00:49:07,760
that now um

1276
00:49:11,510 --> 00:49:09,760
because you know obviously something

1277
00:49:13,829 --> 00:49:11,520
like this can be

1278
00:49:15,349 --> 00:49:13,839
a national security challenge for us no

1279
00:49:18,069 --> 00:49:15,359
doubt about it if they're developed by

1280
00:49:19,750 --> 00:49:18,079
an adversary

1281
00:49:21,829 --> 00:49:19,760
through some breakthrough

1282
00:49:24,790 --> 00:49:21,839
technology they can be very disruptive

1283
00:49:27,589 --> 00:49:24,800
to our military actions

1284
00:49:31,589 --> 00:49:27,599
or at least serve as a destruction

1285
00:49:33,510 --> 00:49:31,599
so my caution would be be careful who we

1286
00:49:35,829 --> 00:49:33,520
share our data with

1287
00:49:38,790 --> 00:49:35,839
and don't necessarily trust some of the

1288
00:49:41,349 --> 00:49:38,800
data we may get from someone else

1289
00:49:46,790 --> 00:49:41,359
and with that i yield back

1290
00:49:50,069 --> 00:49:48,470
thank you mr chairman

1291
00:49:52,230 --> 00:49:50,079
one of the objectives of this open

1292
00:49:54,309 --> 00:49:52,240
hearing is to

1293
00:49:57,030 --> 00:49:54,319
try to erode some of the stigma that

1294
00:49:58,549 --> 00:49:57,040
attaches to in particular our military

1295
00:50:02,150 --> 00:49:58,559
men and women reporting this it's

1296
00:50:03,829 --> 00:50:02,160
obviously really very serious because uh

1297
00:50:05,990 --> 00:50:03,839
should one of our adversaries have

1298
00:50:07,589 --> 00:50:06,000
developed a technology that we don't

1299
00:50:10,309 --> 00:50:07,599
know about it we need to know about it

1300
00:50:13,030 --> 00:50:10,319
yesterday and and obviously

1301
00:50:14,710 --> 00:50:13,040
any sort of stigma that prevents our our

1302
00:50:15,990 --> 00:50:14,720
uh military

1303
00:50:17,510 --> 00:50:16,000
from reporting this data as

1304
00:50:19,750 --> 00:50:17,520
comprehensively as possible as a

1305
00:50:21,430 --> 00:50:19,760
national security threat so i i really

1306
00:50:23,829 --> 00:50:21,440
just have two questions in the service

1307
00:50:26,150 --> 00:50:23,839
of that goal uh the first is

1308
00:50:28,069 --> 00:50:26,160
um the chairman asked that we run that

1309
00:50:30,150 --> 00:50:28,079
video again most people when they see a

1310
00:50:32,069 --> 00:50:30,160
video we're all used to

1311
00:50:34,150 --> 00:50:32,079
seeing things from a car

1312
00:50:36,710 --> 00:50:34,160
seeing things from a sidewalk very few

1313
00:50:38,470 --> 00:50:36,720
people have the experience of observing

1314
00:50:41,589 --> 00:50:38,480
something through night vision goggles

1315
00:50:44,390 --> 00:50:41,599
at mach 1.5 so just talk for a minute

1316
00:50:45,990 --> 00:50:44,400
about if you would uh whichever of you

1317
00:50:47,990 --> 00:50:46,000
is most appropriate

1318
00:50:50,390 --> 00:50:48,000
how radically different

1319
00:50:52,549 --> 00:50:50,400
observation is at high speed in three

1320
00:50:55,589 --> 00:50:52,559
dimension than it is for most of us who

1321
00:50:57,829 --> 00:50:55,599
walk around and drive cars

1322
00:50:59,349 --> 00:50:57,839
um so the first thing i think that's

1323
00:51:01,829 --> 00:50:59,359
important to note about this is there

1324
00:51:04,950 --> 00:51:01,839
are lots of things when you are moving

1325
00:51:06,630 --> 00:51:04,960
very fast and an object is between you

1326
00:51:07,910 --> 00:51:06,640
and a stationary reference point like

1327
00:51:09,510 --> 00:51:07,920
the ground

1328
00:51:11,910 --> 00:51:09,520
it gives a lot of different impressions

1329
00:51:13,750 --> 00:51:11,920
about how quickly something is or isn't

1330
00:51:16,230 --> 00:51:13,760
moving and it actually

1331
00:51:18,870 --> 00:51:16,240
means that it is a challenge

1332
00:51:20,390 --> 00:51:18,880
especially with narrative based data

1333
00:51:21,990 --> 00:51:20,400
to get a lot of information on that

1334
00:51:23,910 --> 00:51:22,000
that's why the sensor data is so

1335
00:51:26,309 --> 00:51:23,920
important because things do happen very

1336
00:51:27,829 --> 00:51:26,319
quickly as you see there

1337
00:51:29,510 --> 00:51:27,839
and sometimes things that happen very

1338
00:51:31,910 --> 00:51:29,520
quickly something may be moving very

1339
00:51:34,069 --> 00:51:31,920
slow that aircraft is moving quite fast

1340
00:51:37,349 --> 00:51:34,079
how fast that object is moving that goes

1341
00:51:39,510 --> 00:51:37,359
by is probably very slow

1342
00:51:41,829 --> 00:51:39,520
so i get i guess my point is that an

1343
00:51:43,589 --> 00:51:41,839
observation either a visual observation

1344
00:51:46,230 --> 00:51:43,599
or a uh

1345
00:51:48,950 --> 00:51:46,240
a electronic observation infrared or

1346
00:51:51,510 --> 00:51:48,960
whatever uh looks radically different

1347
00:51:54,710 --> 00:51:51,520
than it does to most people

1348
00:51:56,549 --> 00:51:54,720
even instruments uh instruments are on

1349
00:51:59,270 --> 00:51:56,559
gimbals and that sort of thing so that

1350
00:52:01,349 --> 00:51:59,280
creates a very unusual

1351
00:52:03,030 --> 00:52:01,359
uh view to again those of us who are

1352
00:52:06,230 --> 00:52:03,040
used to seeing things on in two

1353
00:52:08,790 --> 00:52:07,829
second question

1354
00:52:10,309 --> 00:52:08,800
um

1355
00:52:13,270 --> 00:52:10,319
i think mr bray you said something that

1356
00:52:16,390 --> 00:52:13,280
i want to unpack a little bit uh

1357
00:52:17,670 --> 00:52:16,400
a number of these uaps you said we can't

1358
00:52:20,549 --> 00:52:17,680
explain

1359
00:52:23,349 --> 00:52:20,559
again in the service of sort of reducing

1360
00:52:24,870 --> 00:52:23,359
speculation and conspiracy theories we

1361
00:52:26,710 --> 00:52:24,880
can't explain

1362
00:52:29,030 --> 00:52:26,720
can range from

1363
00:52:30,630 --> 00:52:29,040
a visual observation that was distant on

1364
00:52:32,309 --> 00:52:30,640
a foggy night we don't know what it is

1365
00:52:34,549 --> 00:52:32,319
to

1366
00:52:36,630 --> 00:52:34,559
we've found an organic material that we

1367
00:52:39,430 --> 00:52:36,640
can identify right those are radically

1368
00:52:41,430 --> 00:52:39,440
different world worlds so when you say

1369
00:52:42,549 --> 00:52:41,440
we can't explain give the public a

1370
00:52:44,950 --> 00:52:42,559
little bit

1371
00:52:47,270 --> 00:52:44,960
better sense of where on that spectrum

1372
00:52:49,829 --> 00:52:47,280
of we can't explain we are are we

1373
00:52:51,670 --> 00:52:49,839
holding materials organic or inorganic

1374
00:52:53,510 --> 00:52:51,680
that we don't know about are we

1375
00:52:55,750 --> 00:52:53,520
you know picking up emanations that are

1376
00:52:57,030 --> 00:52:55,760
something other than light or infrared

1377
00:52:58,710 --> 00:52:57,040
that could be deemed to be

1378
00:53:01,030 --> 00:52:58,720
communications give us a sense for what

1379
00:53:03,670 --> 00:53:01,040
you mean when you say we can't explain

1380
00:53:05,270 --> 00:53:03,680
sure when i say we can't explain i mean

1381
00:53:07,349 --> 00:53:05,280
exactly as you described there that

1382
00:53:08,870 --> 00:53:07,359
there is a lot of information like the

1383
00:53:10,950 --> 00:53:08,880
video that we showed in which there's

1384
00:53:13,270 --> 00:53:10,960
simply too little data

1385
00:53:14,950 --> 00:53:13,280
to to create a reasonable explanation

1386
00:53:17,270 --> 00:53:14,960
there are a small handful of cases in

1387
00:53:19,190 --> 00:53:17,280
which we have more data

1388
00:53:21,990 --> 00:53:19,200
that our analysis simply hasn't been

1389
00:53:25,510 --> 00:53:22,000
able to uh to fully pull together a

1390
00:53:26,870 --> 00:53:25,520
picture of what happened um the

1391
00:53:29,510 --> 00:53:26,880
and those are the cases where we talk

1392
00:53:30,870 --> 00:53:29,520
about where we see some indications of

1393
00:53:31,910 --> 00:53:30,880
flight characteristics or signature

1394
00:53:34,549 --> 00:53:31,920
management

1395
00:53:36,150 --> 00:53:34,559
that are not what we had expected

1396
00:53:38,069 --> 00:53:36,160
when it comes to material that we have

1397
00:53:40,630 --> 00:53:38,079
we have no material

1398
00:53:43,510 --> 00:53:40,640
we have detected no emanations

1399
00:53:45,950 --> 00:53:43,520
within the uap task force that that is

1400
00:53:49,510 --> 00:53:45,960
uh that would suggest it's anything

1401
00:53:51,349 --> 00:53:49,520
non-terrestrial uh in origin so there's

1402
00:53:52,549 --> 00:53:51,359
um when i say unexplained i mean

1403
00:53:54,549 --> 00:53:52,559
everything from

1404
00:53:56,870 --> 00:53:54,559
too little too little data

1405
00:53:58,950 --> 00:53:56,880
to we simply the data that we have

1406
00:54:00,549 --> 00:53:58,960
doesn't point us towards an explanation

1407
00:54:01,990 --> 00:54:00,559
uh but we'll go wherever the data takes

1408
00:54:03,990 --> 00:54:02,000
us again we've made no assumptions about

1409
00:54:05,990 --> 00:54:04,000
what this is or isn't uh we're committed

1410
00:54:07,910 --> 00:54:06,000
to understanding these and so we'll go

1411
00:54:09,270 --> 00:54:07,920
wherever that data takes us

1412
00:54:11,510 --> 00:54:09,280
thank you that's that's very helpful

1413
00:54:14,069 --> 00:54:11,520
until i think it bears emphasis

1414
00:54:16,790 --> 00:54:14,079
when you say we can't explain everything

1415
00:54:18,549 --> 00:54:16,800
that you can't explain is in a bucket

1416
00:54:21,270 --> 00:54:18,559
called data

1417
00:54:23,510 --> 00:54:21,280
is that correct and that would mean uh

1418
00:54:25,829 --> 00:54:23,520
data collected by sensors visual

1419
00:54:28,069 --> 00:54:25,839
observations everything that we can't

1420
00:54:31,030 --> 00:54:28,079
explain quote-unquote is in a bucket

1421
00:54:33,510 --> 00:54:31,040
called data right a narrative report uh

1422
00:54:35,190 --> 00:54:33,520
from uh from the early 2000s if it just

1423
00:54:36,950 --> 00:54:35,200
had a little bit of information on it

1424
00:54:38,950 --> 00:54:36,960
would be in our database and it would be

1425
00:54:40,630 --> 00:54:38,960
unresolved i would add to that it's

1426
00:54:42,870 --> 00:54:40,640
insufficient data i mean that's one of

1427
00:54:45,990 --> 00:54:42,880
the challenges we have insufficient data

1428
00:54:48,870 --> 00:54:46,000
either on the event itself the object

1429
00:54:51,430 --> 00:54:48,880
itself or insufficient data or plug-in

1430
00:54:52,870 --> 00:54:51,440
with some other organization or agency

1431
00:54:55,510 --> 00:54:52,880
that may have had something in that

1432
00:54:57,030 --> 00:54:55,520
space at that time so it's a data issue

1433
00:54:58,789 --> 00:54:57,040
that we're that we're facing in many of

1434
00:55:00,870 --> 00:54:58,799
these instances congressman understood

1435
00:55:04,230 --> 00:55:00,880
thank you very much yieldback

1436
00:55:05,270 --> 00:55:04,240
gentlemen yields back mr gallagher

1437
00:55:06,870 --> 00:55:05,280
thank you mr chairman thank you for

1438
00:55:08,390 --> 00:55:06,880
allowing me to join this hearing um i

1439
00:55:11,589 --> 00:55:08,400
really appreciate the witnesses

1440
00:55:14,309 --> 00:55:11,599
testimony um mr moultrie as the chairman

1441
00:55:17,109 --> 00:55:14,319
uh mentioned uh dod had initiative to

1442
00:55:18,230 --> 00:55:17,119
study ufos in the 1960s called project

1443
00:55:20,069 --> 00:55:18,240
blue book

1444
00:55:22,549 --> 00:55:20,079
it's also been well reported in our

1445
00:55:24,230 --> 00:55:22,559
briefing and in other places that we

1446
00:55:27,510 --> 00:55:24,240
have more have more recent projects

1447
00:55:30,230 --> 00:55:27,520
specifically atip could you describe any

1448
00:55:33,030 --> 00:55:30,240
other initiatives that the dod or dod

1449
00:55:35,750 --> 00:55:33,040
contractors have managed after project

1450
00:55:38,230 --> 00:55:35,760
blue book ended and prior to atip

1451
00:55:39,829 --> 00:55:38,240
beginning did anything also predate

1452
00:55:41,829 --> 00:55:39,839
project blue book

1453
00:55:43,109 --> 00:55:41,839
so i i can't speak to what may have

1454
00:55:45,030 --> 00:55:43,119
predated

1455
00:55:46,390 --> 00:55:45,040
project blue book i mean of course

1456
00:55:47,510 --> 00:55:46,400
there's roswell and all these other

1457
00:55:49,109 --> 00:55:47,520
things that people have talked about

1458
00:55:50,870 --> 00:55:49,119
over the years

1459
00:55:54,309 --> 00:55:50,880
i'm familiar with blue book i'm familiar

1460
00:55:57,030 --> 00:55:54,319
with uh with atip uh i haven't seen

1461
00:55:59,190 --> 00:55:57,040
other documented studies that have been

1462
00:56:00,309 --> 00:55:59,200
done by dod in that regard

1463
00:56:02,950 --> 00:56:00,319
so you're not aware of anything in

1464
00:56:04,789 --> 00:56:02,960
between project blue book and atip not

1465
00:56:06,789 --> 00:56:04,799
aware of anything that's uh official

1466
00:56:09,990 --> 00:56:06,799
that was done in between those two

1467
00:56:11,510 --> 00:56:10,000
hasn't been brought to my attention okay

1468
00:56:14,630 --> 00:56:11,520
additionally are you aware of any other

1469
00:56:17,430 --> 00:56:14,640
dod or dod contract programs focused on

1470
00:56:19,349 --> 00:56:17,440
uaps from a technological engineering

1471
00:56:21,109 --> 00:56:19,359
perspective and by that i mean are you

1472
00:56:22,710 --> 00:56:21,119
aware of any technology initiatives

1473
00:56:24,710 --> 00:56:22,720
focused on this topic

1474
00:56:26,069 --> 00:56:24,720
other than initiatives focused on the

1475
00:56:28,230 --> 00:56:26,079
individual case

1476
00:56:31,030 --> 00:56:28,240
investigations i am not aware of any

1477
00:56:31,990 --> 00:56:31,040
contractual programs that are focused on

1478
00:56:34,309 --> 00:56:32,000
uh

1479
00:56:36,150 --> 00:56:34,319
any anything related to

1480
00:56:38,549 --> 00:56:36,160
this other than what we are doing in the

1481
00:56:40,470 --> 00:56:38,559
navy task force and what we are about to

1482
00:56:42,789 --> 00:56:40,480
launch in terms of our effort

1483
00:56:44,150 --> 00:56:42,799
same question for you mr bray

1484
00:56:46,150 --> 00:56:44,160
same answer not aware of anything

1485
00:56:47,750 --> 00:56:46,160
outside what we uh are doing in the uap

1486
00:56:49,670 --> 00:56:47,760
task force so just confirm you're not

1487
00:56:51,670 --> 00:56:49,680
aware of any technology or engineering

1488
00:56:53,109 --> 00:56:51,680
resources that have been focused on

1489
00:56:54,549 --> 00:56:53,119
these efforts besides what we've

1490
00:56:59,030 --> 00:56:54,559
mentioned today

1491
00:56:59,910 --> 00:56:59,040
once again i'll say no contractual uh

1492
00:57:04,870 --> 00:56:59,920
or

1493
00:57:06,710 --> 00:57:04,880
involved the reason why i i qualify

1494
00:57:08,710 --> 00:57:06,720
yeah let me qualify it that way

1495
00:57:10,150 --> 00:57:08,720
i can't speak to what people may be

1496
00:57:11,510 --> 00:57:10,160
looking at in the department somebody

1497
00:57:12,870 --> 00:57:11,520
says i'm looking at something i'm

1498
00:57:15,109 --> 00:57:12,880
looking at something that may be

1499
00:57:16,950 --> 00:57:15,119
unidentified and i can't speak to that

1500
00:57:18,230 --> 00:57:16,960
speak to official programs we have on

1501
00:57:19,910 --> 00:57:18,240
the record

1502
00:57:22,630 --> 00:57:19,920
it's also been reported that there have

1503
00:57:24,150 --> 00:57:22,640
been uap observed and interacting with

1504
00:57:25,910 --> 00:57:24,160
and flying over sensitive military

1505
00:57:27,910 --> 00:57:25,920
facilities particularly not just ranges

1506
00:57:29,829 --> 00:57:27,920
but uh some facilities housing our

1507
00:57:32,630 --> 00:57:29,839
strategic nuclear forces one such

1508
00:57:34,630 --> 00:57:32,640
incident allegedly occurred

1509
00:57:36,230 --> 00:57:34,640
at malmstrom air force base in which 10

1510
00:57:38,470 --> 00:57:36,240
of our nuclear icbms were rendered

1511
00:57:40,230 --> 00:57:38,480
inoperable at the same time a glowing

1512
00:57:41,670 --> 00:57:40,240
red orb was observed overhead i'm not

1513
00:57:43,910 --> 00:57:41,680
commenting on the accuracy of this i'm

1514
00:57:45,349 --> 00:57:43,920
simply asking you whether you're aware

1515
00:57:46,870 --> 00:57:45,359
of it and whether you have any comment

1516
00:57:48,390 --> 00:57:46,880
on the accuracy of that report we passed

1517
00:57:50,230 --> 00:57:48,400
that to mr bray if you've been looking

1518
00:57:52,390 --> 00:57:50,240
at the uaps over the last three years

1519
00:57:54,870 --> 00:57:52,400
that data is not within the holdings of

1520
00:57:58,069 --> 00:57:54,880
the uap task force

1521
00:57:59,510 --> 00:57:58,079
okay but are you aware of the the report

1522
00:58:01,349 --> 00:57:59,520
or that the data

1523
00:58:03,270 --> 00:58:01,359
exists somewhere

1524
00:58:05,030 --> 00:58:03,280
i i have uh

1525
00:58:06,309 --> 00:58:05,040
i have heard stories i have not seen the

1526
00:58:09,030 --> 00:58:06,319
official data on that so you've just

1527
00:58:11,589 --> 00:58:09,040
seen informal stories no official

1528
00:58:13,990 --> 00:58:11,599
assessment that you've done or exists

1529
00:58:17,349 --> 00:58:14,000
within dod that you're aware of uh

1530
00:58:18,710 --> 00:58:17,359
regarding the malmstrom incident

1531
00:58:20,390 --> 00:58:18,720
all i can speak to is you know what's

1532
00:58:22,789 --> 00:58:20,400
within my cognizance the uap task force

1533
00:58:23,829 --> 00:58:22,799
and we have not looked at that incident

1534
00:58:25,910 --> 00:58:23,839
well i was i missed a pretty high

1535
00:58:28,710 --> 00:58:25,920
profile incident i i don't claim to be

1536
00:58:30,789 --> 00:58:28,720
an expert on this but that's out there

1537
00:58:31,750 --> 00:58:30,799
in the ether

1538
00:58:33,829 --> 00:58:31,760
you're you're the guy who's

1539
00:58:35,270 --> 00:58:33,839
investigating it i mean who else is

1540
00:58:36,950 --> 00:58:35,280
doing it if something was officially

1541
00:58:38,470 --> 00:58:36,960
brought to our attention we would look

1542
00:58:39,589 --> 00:58:38,480
at it uh there are many things that are

1543
00:58:41,190 --> 00:58:39,599
out there in the ether that aren't

1544
00:58:42,630 --> 00:58:41,200
officially brought to our attention how

1545
00:58:44,870 --> 00:58:42,640
would it have to be officially brought

1546
00:58:46,870 --> 00:58:44,880
to you i'm bringing it to you

1547
00:58:48,390 --> 00:58:46,880
this is pretty official sure so we'll go

1548
00:58:50,150 --> 00:58:48,400
back and take a look at it but generally

1549
00:58:51,990 --> 00:58:50,160
there is some

1550
00:58:53,430 --> 00:58:52,000
authoritative figure that says there is

1551
00:58:54,870 --> 00:58:53,440
an incident that occurred we'd like you

1552
00:58:56,470 --> 00:58:54,880
to look at this

1553
00:58:57,990 --> 00:58:56,480
but in terms of just tracking what may

1554
00:59:00,390 --> 00:58:58,000
be in the media that says that something

1555
00:59:01,910 --> 00:59:00,400
occurred at this time at this place

1556
00:59:03,109 --> 00:59:01,920
there are probably a lot of leads that

1557
00:59:04,470 --> 00:59:03,119
we would have to follow up on i don't

1558
00:59:05,589 --> 00:59:04,480
think we were resourced to do that right

1559
00:59:07,349 --> 00:59:05,599
now well i don't claim to be an

1560
00:59:09,430 --> 00:59:07,359
authoritative figure but for what it's

1561
00:59:10,789 --> 00:59:09,440
worth i would like you to look into it

1562
00:59:12,950 --> 00:59:10,799
for another reason you could dismiss it

1563
00:59:15,349 --> 00:59:12,960
and say this is not worth wasting

1564
00:59:16,950 --> 00:59:15,359
resources on um and then finally are you

1565
00:59:19,190 --> 00:59:16,960
aware of a document that appeared around

1566
00:59:23,430 --> 00:59:19,200
2019 uh sometimes called the admiral

1567
00:59:25,990 --> 00:59:23,440
wilson memo or ew notes memo

1568
00:59:27,990 --> 00:59:26,000
i am i'm not are you trying i'm not

1569
00:59:29,589 --> 00:59:28,000
personally aware of that okay this is a

1570
00:59:31,510 --> 00:59:29,599
document in which again i'm not

1571
00:59:33,190 --> 00:59:31,520
commenting on veracity i was hoping you

1572
00:59:35,109 --> 00:59:33,200
would help me with that in which a

1573
00:59:37,670 --> 00:59:35,119
former head of dia claims to have had a

1574
00:59:39,430 --> 00:59:37,680
conversation with the doctor eric wilson

1575
00:59:41,270 --> 00:59:39,440
and claims to have uh sort of been made

1576
00:59:44,549 --> 00:59:41,280
aware of certain

1577
00:59:46,470 --> 00:59:44,559
contractors or dod programs um that he

1578
00:59:47,750 --> 00:59:46,480
tried to get fuller access to and was

1579
00:59:50,870 --> 00:59:47,760
denied

1580
00:59:52,870 --> 00:59:50,880
access to um so you're not aware of that

1581
00:59:54,230 --> 00:59:52,880
i'm malware congressman uh in my 10

1582
00:59:55,990 --> 00:59:54,240
seconds remaining then i guess i just

1583
01:00:00,230 --> 00:59:56,000
would ask mr chairman unanimous consent

1584
01:00:04,069 --> 01:00:02,069
without objection thank you mr chairman

1585
01:00:06,789 --> 01:00:04,079
appreciate it

1586
01:00:08,390 --> 01:00:06,799
mr christian murthy

1587
01:00:10,230 --> 01:00:08,400
thank you mr chair and thank you to both

1588
01:00:13,349 --> 01:00:10,240
of you for appearing today and for your

1589
01:00:15,829 --> 01:00:13,359
public service first question is uh

1590
01:00:19,109 --> 01:00:15,839
there have been no collisions between

1591
01:00:20,309 --> 01:00:19,119
any u.s assets in one of these uaps

1592
01:00:21,829 --> 01:00:20,319
correct

1593
01:00:23,990 --> 01:00:21,839
we haven't had a collision we've had at

1594
01:00:25,910 --> 01:00:24,000
least 11 near misses though

1595
01:00:27,510 --> 01:00:25,920
and

1596
01:00:29,270 --> 01:00:27,520
maybe we'll talk about those 11 near

1597
01:00:30,470 --> 01:00:29,280
misses or any place where there's close

1598
01:00:32,470 --> 01:00:30,480
proximity

1599
01:00:35,109 --> 01:00:32,480
um i assume

1600
01:00:37,109 --> 01:00:35,119
or tell me if i'm wrong there's been no

1601
01:00:39,430 --> 01:00:37,119
uh attempt

1602
01:00:42,870 --> 01:00:39,440
there's no communications

1603
01:00:45,910 --> 01:00:42,880
uh or any kind of uh communication

1604
01:00:48,470 --> 01:00:45,920
signals that emanate from those objects

1605
01:00:50,309 --> 01:00:48,480
uh that we've detected correct

1606
01:00:52,390 --> 01:00:50,319
that's correct and have we attempted to

1607
01:00:53,910 --> 01:00:52,400
communicate with those objects

1608
01:00:55,430 --> 01:00:53,920
uh

1609
01:00:58,309 --> 01:00:55,440
no

1610
01:01:01,430 --> 01:00:58,319
so we don't we don't even put out an

1611
01:01:02,549 --> 01:01:01,440
alert saying you know uh us

1612
01:01:05,109 --> 01:01:02,559
um

1613
01:01:07,109 --> 01:01:05,119
identi you know identify yourself

1614
01:01:08,470 --> 01:01:07,119
uh you are you know within our flight

1615
01:01:11,030 --> 01:01:08,480
path or something like that we we

1616
01:01:12,870 --> 01:01:11,040
haven't said anything like that

1617
01:01:15,589 --> 01:01:12,880
we've not put anything out like that

1618
01:01:16,789 --> 01:01:15,599
generally speaking uh what you know for

1619
01:01:19,109 --> 01:01:16,799
example in the video that we showed

1620
01:01:21,750 --> 01:01:19,119
earlier uh it appears to be something

1621
01:01:23,349 --> 01:01:21,760
that is uh you know unmanned uh appears

1622
01:01:25,750 --> 01:01:23,359
to be something that uh

1623
01:01:27,990 --> 01:01:25,760
may or may not be in controlled flight

1624
01:01:30,630 --> 01:01:28,000
uh and so we've not attempted any

1625
01:01:32,870 --> 01:01:30,640
communication with that

1626
01:01:35,349 --> 01:01:32,880
okay so um

1627
01:01:38,950 --> 01:01:35,359
and i assume we've never discharged any

1628
01:01:40,069 --> 01:01:38,960
armaments against a uap correct

1629
01:01:42,309 --> 01:01:40,079
that's correct

1630
01:01:44,950 --> 01:01:42,319
um how about wreckage

1631
01:01:47,589 --> 01:01:44,960
have we come across any wreckage

1632
01:01:49,510 --> 01:01:47,599
of any kind of

1633
01:01:52,870 --> 01:01:49,520
object that

1634
01:01:54,230 --> 01:01:52,880
has now been examined by you

1635
01:01:57,109 --> 01:01:54,240
the uap task force doesn't have any

1636
01:01:58,230 --> 01:01:57,119
wreckage that isn't uh explainable that

1637
01:02:00,230 --> 01:01:58,240
isn't consistent with being of

1638
01:02:02,150 --> 01:02:00,240
terrestrial origin do we have any

1639
01:02:04,230 --> 01:02:02,160
sensors underwater

1640
01:02:08,150 --> 01:02:04,240
to

1641
01:02:10,230 --> 01:02:08,160
detect on submerged uaps uh anything

1642
01:02:11,910 --> 01:02:10,240
that is in the ocean or in the seas so i

1643
01:02:14,470 --> 01:02:11,920
think that would be more appropriately

1644
01:02:16,309 --> 01:02:14,480
addressed in closed session sir okay

1645
01:02:18,470 --> 01:02:16,319
um

1646
01:02:19,349 --> 01:02:18,480
i think one of the biggest questions

1647
01:02:22,150 --> 01:02:19,359
that

1648
01:02:24,549 --> 01:02:22,160
um

1649
01:02:25,589 --> 01:02:24,559
we say with a lot of probability we say

1650
01:02:27,589 --> 01:02:25,599
they

1651
01:02:30,470 --> 01:02:27,599
quote unquote probably do represent

1652
01:02:31,829 --> 01:02:30,480
physical objects close quote

1653
01:02:34,950 --> 01:02:31,839
um

1654
01:02:37,029 --> 01:02:34,960
when we say probably is that because we

1655
01:02:40,150 --> 01:02:37,039
cannot conclusively

1656
01:02:41,510 --> 01:02:40,160
say that they are physical objects

1657
01:02:42,630 --> 01:02:41,520
in the task force

1658
01:02:44,950 --> 01:02:42,640
report

1659
01:02:46,230 --> 01:02:44,960
when i say probably represent physical

1660
01:02:49,670 --> 01:02:46,240
objects

1661
01:02:50,710 --> 01:02:49,680
there could be some that are more of a

1662
01:02:51,990 --> 01:02:50,720
uh

1663
01:02:53,589 --> 01:02:52,000
of a

1664
01:02:55,109 --> 01:02:53,599
meteorological phenomena something like

1665
01:02:58,150 --> 01:02:55,119
that that may not

1666
01:02:59,349 --> 01:02:58,160
uh maybe a physical object in the

1667
01:03:01,190 --> 01:02:59,359
in the sense that most people think of

1668
01:03:03,670 --> 01:03:01,200
something you go up and touch but the

1669
01:03:05,990 --> 01:03:03,680
ones where you say most of them

1670
01:03:08,789 --> 01:03:06,000
represent physical objects can you say

1671
01:03:11,589 --> 01:03:08,799
that they are definitely like with 100

1672
01:03:13,510 --> 01:03:11,599
certainty that they are physical objects

1673
01:03:15,510 --> 01:03:13,520
i can say with certainty that a number

1674
01:03:17,829 --> 01:03:15,520
of these are physical objects

1675
01:03:20,069 --> 01:03:17,839
okay so there we can't rule out that

1676
01:03:23,029 --> 01:03:20,079
some of them may not be physical objects

1677
01:03:25,349 --> 01:03:23,039
some certainly could be a sensor anomaly

1678
01:03:28,710 --> 01:03:25,359
or something like that some could be

1679
01:03:31,109 --> 01:03:28,720
now how about uh with regard to uaps

1680
01:03:32,230 --> 01:03:31,119
we've talked about uips on training

1681
01:03:34,230 --> 01:03:32,240
areas

1682
01:03:36,150 --> 01:03:34,240
but obviously

1683
01:03:39,589 --> 01:03:36,160
there's some sensor bias i would think

1684
01:03:41,510 --> 01:03:39,599
we we put sensors in training areas

1685
01:03:45,750 --> 01:03:41,520
how about with regards to non-training

1686
01:03:48,789 --> 01:03:45,760
areas do we track what's an open source

1687
01:03:51,750 --> 01:03:48,799
and what civilians and others have

1688
01:03:53,029 --> 01:03:51,760
tracked and have we found similarities

1689
01:03:55,109 --> 01:03:53,039
to

1690
01:03:57,589 --> 01:03:55,119
what they've observed in terms of uaps

1691
01:03:59,750 --> 01:03:57,599
in non-training areas to the ones that

1692
01:04:01,589 --> 01:03:59,760
are in training areas

1693
01:04:03,029 --> 01:04:01,599
the uap task force has

1694
01:04:05,029 --> 01:04:03,039
worked very hard to to make sure the

1695
01:04:07,670 --> 01:04:05,039
data set that we're working with is a

1696
01:04:09,029 --> 01:04:07,680
data set that we have very good control

1697
01:04:11,270 --> 01:04:09,039
over that data

1698
01:04:12,870 --> 01:04:11,280
so we have some partnerships with faa so

1699
01:04:15,349 --> 01:04:12,880
that we get some of that so we get that

1700
01:04:17,430 --> 01:04:15,359
reporting in um but if it comes to just

1701
01:04:18,710 --> 01:04:17,440
you know open source reports or someone

1702
01:04:20,069 --> 01:04:18,720
says that they saw something that

1703
01:04:22,710 --> 01:04:20,079
generally does not make it into our

1704
01:04:25,910 --> 01:04:22,720
database so basically it sounds like we

1705
01:04:27,829 --> 01:04:25,920
have a good partnership with faa

1706
01:04:29,990 --> 01:04:27,839
but apart from faa we don't have

1707
01:04:31,029 --> 01:04:30,000
partnerships with other agencies or

1708
01:04:33,510 --> 01:04:31,039
other

1709
01:04:34,630 --> 01:04:33,520
entities that might be tracking so that

1710
01:04:37,430 --> 01:04:34,640
we could

1711
01:04:39,270 --> 01:04:37,440
enlarge our data set to make comparison

1712
01:04:41,430 --> 01:04:39,280
so we will so that's the goal of this

1713
01:04:43,750 --> 01:04:41,440
next effort will be to uh expand that

1714
01:04:45,670 --> 01:04:43,760
relationship with the uh the rest of

1715
01:04:47,029 --> 01:04:45,680
government and the interagency so we can

1716
01:04:49,589 --> 01:04:47,039
understand what they're seeing what

1717
01:04:51,190 --> 01:04:49,599
we're seeing we can correlate on uh each

1718
01:04:53,109 --> 01:04:51,200
other's holdings because they resolve

1719
01:04:55,349 --> 01:04:53,119
this sorry to interrupt but i think that

1720
01:04:57,270 --> 01:04:55,359
we're we might have a bias right now

1721
01:04:59,190 --> 01:04:57,280
going on with regards to just reporting

1722
01:05:00,950 --> 01:04:59,200
on uaps being in training areas when we

1723
01:05:02,950 --> 01:05:00,960
don't really track what's happening

1724
01:05:04,870 --> 01:05:02,960
elsewhere last question have our

1725
01:05:07,670 --> 01:05:04,880
encounters with uaps alter the

1726
01:05:09,750 --> 01:05:07,680
development of our either our offense or

1727
01:05:12,470 --> 01:05:09,760
offensive or defensive capabilities or

1728
01:05:14,549 --> 01:05:12,480
even our sensor capabilities

1729
01:05:17,829 --> 01:05:14,559
we'll take that for the closed session

1730
01:05:20,230 --> 01:05:17,839
okay great thank you

1731
01:05:21,990 --> 01:05:20,240
mr lahood

1732
01:05:24,789 --> 01:05:22,000
thank you mr chairman and i want to

1733
01:05:28,230 --> 01:05:24,799
thank the witnesses for being here today

1734
01:05:30,470 --> 01:05:28,240
uh obviously this topic of uaps uh has

1735
01:05:31,430 --> 01:05:30,480
attracted a lot of interest in people

1736
01:05:32,630 --> 01:05:31,440
that are

1737
01:05:36,549 --> 01:05:32,640
um

1738
01:05:38,789 --> 01:05:36,559
curious about uh this this hearing today

1739
01:05:40,789 --> 01:05:38,799
as we talk about um

1740
01:05:41,750 --> 01:05:40,799
and i would say there's a lot of what i

1741
01:05:44,069 --> 01:05:41,760
would call

1742
01:05:46,549 --> 01:05:44,079
amateur interest groups uh that are

1743
01:05:49,950 --> 01:05:46,559
involved in the uap field

1744
01:05:52,470 --> 01:05:49,960
mike my question is when um there are

1745
01:05:54,630 --> 01:05:52,480
unsubstantiated claims or manufactured

1746
01:05:56,549 --> 01:05:54,640
claims of uaps or

1747
01:05:58,230 --> 01:05:56,559
kind of false information that's put out

1748
01:06:00,390 --> 01:05:58,240
there uh

1749
01:06:02,150 --> 01:06:00,400
what are the consequences for people

1750
01:06:07,029 --> 01:06:02,160
that are involved with that or groups

1751
01:06:09,589 --> 01:06:08,789
so one of the concerns that we have is

1752
01:06:20,309 --> 01:06:09,599
that

1753
01:06:22,710 --> 01:06:20,319
could be considered to be somewhat

1754
01:06:23,910 --> 01:06:22,720
self-serving uh we're trying to do

1755
01:06:26,069 --> 01:06:23,920
what's in the what's in the best

1756
01:06:28,230 --> 01:06:26,079
interests of one the department of

1757
01:06:30,390 --> 01:06:28,240
defense and then two what's in the best

1758
01:06:33,670 --> 01:06:30,400
interest of the public to ensure that we

1759
01:06:35,510 --> 01:06:33,680
can put factual based information back

1760
01:06:36,710 --> 01:06:35,520
into the mainstream and back into the

1761
01:06:38,710 --> 01:06:36,720
bloodstream

1762
01:06:40,710 --> 01:06:38,720
of the reporting

1763
01:06:41,990 --> 01:06:40,720
media that we have so people understand

1764
01:06:45,430 --> 01:06:42,000
what's there

1765
01:06:47,510 --> 01:06:45,440
it's important because we are attempting

1766
01:06:48,870 --> 01:06:47,520
as this hearing as has drawn out to

1767
01:06:51,510 --> 01:06:48,880
understand

1768
01:06:54,710 --> 01:06:51,520
one what may just be natural phenomenon

1769
01:06:56,230 --> 01:06:54,720
to what may be sensor phenomenology or

1770
01:06:57,190 --> 01:06:56,240
things that were happening with censors

1771
01:06:58,950 --> 01:06:57,200
three

1772
01:07:01,430 --> 01:06:58,960
what may be legitimate counter

1773
01:07:03,029 --> 01:07:01,440
intelligence threats to

1774
01:07:05,510 --> 01:07:03,039
places that we have or bases or

1775
01:07:06,710 --> 01:07:05,520
installations or security threats to our

1776
01:07:09,589 --> 01:07:06,720
platforms

1777
01:07:11,109 --> 01:07:09,599
and anything that diverts us off of what

1778
01:07:13,430 --> 01:07:11,119
we have with the resources that have

1779
01:07:14,870 --> 01:07:13,440
been allocated to us send us off in

1780
01:07:16,710 --> 01:07:14,880
these spurious

1781
01:07:18,309 --> 01:07:16,720
chases and hunts that are just not

1782
01:07:20,309 --> 01:07:18,319
helpful and they also helped that well

1783
01:07:23,190 --> 01:07:20,319
they also contribute to the undermining

1784
01:07:25,270 --> 01:07:23,200
of the confidence that the congress and

1785
01:07:27,910 --> 01:07:25,280
the american people have that we are

1786
01:07:30,150 --> 01:07:27,920
trying to get to the root cause of

1787
01:07:31,990 --> 01:07:30,160
what's happening here report on that and

1788
01:07:34,390 --> 01:07:32,000
then feed that back into our national

1789
01:07:36,150 --> 01:07:34,400
security apparatus so we are able to

1790
01:07:39,029 --> 01:07:36,160
protect the american people and our

1791
01:07:40,789 --> 01:07:39,039
allies so it is harmful it is hurtful

1792
01:07:42,870 --> 01:07:40,799
but hopefully if we get more information

1793
01:07:44,789 --> 01:07:42,880
out there we'll start to lessen the

1794
01:07:47,750 --> 01:07:44,799
impact of some of those spurious reports

1795
01:07:49,750 --> 01:07:47,760
so so just taking that a step further so

1796
01:07:51,750 --> 01:07:49,760
though that misinformation false

1797
01:07:53,270 --> 01:07:51,760
narratives manufactured so what are the

1798
01:07:54,950 --> 01:07:53,280
consequences are there legal

1799
01:07:56,470 --> 01:07:54,960
consequences are there examples that you

1800
01:07:58,710 --> 01:07:56,480
can give us where people have been held

1801
01:08:01,109 --> 01:07:58,720
accountable by this misinformation or

1802
01:08:02,950 --> 01:08:01,119
disinformation i i can't give you you

1803
01:08:05,670 --> 01:08:02,960
know any examples where somebody's been

1804
01:08:07,670 --> 01:08:05,680
legally held liable for putting

1805
01:08:09,270 --> 01:08:07,680
something out there but well i guess

1806
01:08:12,309 --> 01:08:09,280
what's the deterrent from people

1807
01:08:14,309 --> 01:08:12,319
engaging in this activity yeah

1808
01:08:16,709 --> 01:08:14,319
i don't i don't know i i don't have that

1809
01:08:19,110 --> 01:08:16,719
answer that's something that uh you know

1810
01:08:21,269 --> 01:08:19,120
welcome to dialogue with congress to

1811
01:08:23,430 --> 01:08:21,279
talk about that with the members who you

1812
01:08:25,430 --> 01:08:23,440
know help legislate those laws and say

1813
01:08:27,669 --> 01:08:25,440
what should be the uh the legal

1814
01:08:29,829 --> 01:08:27,679
ramifications that we could use to

1815
01:08:31,189 --> 01:08:29,839
potentially hold individuals accountable

1816
01:08:32,630 --> 01:08:31,199
whether it be

1817
01:08:35,749 --> 01:08:32,640
citizens or

1818
01:08:39,030 --> 01:08:35,759
information that might be injected into

1819
01:08:40,630 --> 01:08:39,040
our media by other uh other forces or

1820
01:08:43,030 --> 01:08:40,640
other countries if you will

1821
01:08:45,110 --> 01:08:43,040
and in terms of dods and uh you know

1822
01:08:47,590 --> 01:08:45,120
review and analysis in this field i mean

1823
01:08:49,189 --> 01:08:47,600
is there is there a standard in place

1824
01:08:51,349 --> 01:08:49,199
when it comes to uaps i mean is there

1825
01:08:54,550 --> 01:08:51,359
any guidance you look to that's codified

1826
01:08:56,709 --> 01:08:54,560
in law or otherwise within dod that kind

1827
01:08:58,470 --> 01:08:56,719
of sets out the standards for uaps and

1828
01:09:00,309 --> 01:08:58,480
and what to look for i think that's part

1829
01:09:02,550 --> 01:09:00,319
of what the the the group that we're

1830
01:09:04,470 --> 01:09:02,560
standing up now will be uh charted to do

1831
01:09:06,390 --> 01:09:04,480
we're actually from my organization

1832
01:09:07,669 --> 01:09:06,400
we'll be looking at policy and standards

1833
01:09:08,709 --> 01:09:07,679
that we have

1834
01:09:12,709 --> 01:09:08,719
to

1835
01:09:14,470 --> 01:09:12,719
actually put in place and promulgate

1836
01:09:16,309 --> 01:09:14,480
across our government

1837
01:09:19,749 --> 01:09:16,319
thank you i yield back

1838
01:09:21,030 --> 01:09:19,759
gentleman yields back mr welch

1839
01:09:23,349 --> 01:09:21,040
thank you i'm gonna file i'm gonna

1840
01:09:26,309 --> 01:09:23,359
follow on the the line of questions from

1841
01:09:28,229 --> 01:09:26,319
mr lahood uh gentlemen what seems

1842
01:09:30,149 --> 01:09:28,239
incredibly difficult for you is that

1843
01:09:33,430 --> 01:09:30,159
there's two almost competing but

1844
01:09:35,510 --> 01:09:33,440
different uh narratives one is

1845
01:09:36,789 --> 01:09:35,520
it's

1846
01:09:38,470 --> 01:09:36,799
no one knows whether there's

1847
01:09:40,870 --> 01:09:38,480
extraterrestrial life it's a big

1848
01:09:42,630 --> 01:09:40,880
universe and it would be

1849
01:09:45,590 --> 01:09:42,640
uh pretty presumptuous to have a hard

1850
01:09:47,990 --> 01:09:45,600
and fast conclusion and then if there is

1851
01:09:49,990 --> 01:09:48,000
it's not beyond the realm of possibility

1852
01:09:50,950 --> 01:09:50,000
that there is some exploration coming

1853
01:09:52,789 --> 01:09:50,960
here

1854
01:09:54,870 --> 01:09:52,799
uh and that underlies a lot of the

1855
01:09:56,390 --> 01:09:54,880
reports you get i think mr lahood was

1856
01:09:58,790 --> 01:09:56,400
asking about that people think there

1857
01:10:00,229 --> 01:09:58,800
must be extraterrestrial life and it's

1858
01:10:02,390 --> 01:10:00,239
not at all

1859
01:10:04,950 --> 01:10:02,400
beyond the pale that uh there would be a

1860
01:10:06,790 --> 01:10:04,960
visit here on the other hand you as a

1861
01:10:09,910 --> 01:10:06,800
dod you have the responsibility to make

1862
01:10:12,070 --> 01:10:09,920
sure uh that our national security is

1863
01:10:14,070 --> 01:10:12,080
protected and that if there are

1864
01:10:16,390 --> 01:10:14,080
surveillance drones or

1865
01:10:19,510 --> 01:10:16,400
uh active drones that can disable our

1866
01:10:20,709 --> 01:10:19,520
systems uh that has to be analyzed has

1867
01:10:23,350 --> 01:10:20,719
to be stopped

1868
01:10:24,870 --> 01:10:23,360
so how do you divide the

1869
01:10:27,750 --> 01:10:24,880
these how do you separate your

1870
01:10:28,550 --> 01:10:27,760
responsibilities where uh you get all

1871
01:10:31,590 --> 01:10:28,560
these

1872
01:10:34,070 --> 01:10:31,600
reports from folks who

1873
01:10:36,390 --> 01:10:34,080
may be in good faith maybe not

1874
01:10:39,910 --> 01:10:36,400
believe that you should be investigating

1875
01:10:43,030 --> 01:10:41,430
report of a

1876
01:10:45,350 --> 01:10:43,040
extraterrestrial

1877
01:10:47,669 --> 01:10:45,360
incident i'll start with you mr moultrie

1878
01:10:50,709 --> 01:10:47,679
sure indeed congressman and thank you

1879
01:10:51,210 --> 01:10:50,719
for the question um it's important that

1880
01:10:52,390 --> 01:10:51,220
we

1881
01:10:54,950 --> 01:10:52,400
[Music]

1882
01:10:56,470 --> 01:10:54,960
as a part of this effort

1883
01:10:57,910 --> 01:10:56,480
really

1884
01:10:59,990 --> 01:10:57,920
build out the relationship that we have

1885
01:11:01,990 --> 01:11:00,000
with others including nasa and for the

1886
01:11:04,070 --> 01:11:02,000
reasons that you just pointed out

1887
01:11:05,270 --> 01:11:04,080
so there are elements in our government

1888
01:11:06,950 --> 01:11:05,280
that are

1889
01:11:09,910 --> 01:11:06,960
engaged in

1890
01:11:11,110 --> 01:11:09,920
uh looking for life in other places and

1891
01:11:12,390 --> 01:11:11,120
they have been doing that for decades

1892
01:11:14,310 --> 01:11:12,400
right they've been searching for

1893
01:11:16,149 --> 01:11:14,320
extraterrestrial life

1894
01:11:18,070 --> 01:11:16,159
there are astro biologists who have been

1895
01:11:22,470 --> 01:11:18,080
doing this too we're a part of that same

1896
01:11:24,229 --> 01:11:22,480
government and so our goal is not to

1897
01:11:25,590 --> 01:11:24,239
potentially cover up something if we

1898
01:11:26,470 --> 01:11:25,600
were to find something it's to

1899
01:11:29,430 --> 01:11:26,480
understand

1900
01:11:33,350 --> 01:11:29,440
what may be out there uh

1901
01:11:34,790 --> 01:11:33,360
examine what um what it may mean for us

1902
01:11:36,709 --> 01:11:34,800
if there are any from a defense

1903
01:11:38,950 --> 01:11:36,719
perspective any national security

1904
01:11:41,110 --> 01:11:38,960
implications or ramifications but then

1905
01:11:42,229 --> 01:11:41,120
to work with organizations as

1906
01:11:45,430 --> 01:11:42,239
appropriate if it's a weather

1907
01:11:47,669 --> 01:11:45,440
phenomenology with noaa if it's uh an uh

1908
01:11:49,510 --> 01:11:47,679
potential for extraterrestrial life or

1909
01:11:51,270 --> 01:11:49,520
an indication of extraordinary life with

1910
01:11:53,030 --> 01:11:51,280
someone like nasa

1911
01:11:55,430 --> 01:11:53,040
the transparency actually is very

1912
01:11:57,510 --> 01:11:55,440
important completely for public uh

1913
01:11:58,870 --> 01:11:57,520
consumption completely but we're going

1914
01:12:01,750 --> 01:11:58,880
to have a classified briefing and

1915
01:12:03,750 --> 01:12:01,760
without going into the details uh of

1916
01:12:07,270 --> 01:12:03,760
what kinds of secrets

1917
01:12:09,430 --> 01:12:07,280
that we can't share here

1918
01:12:10,870 --> 01:12:09,440
what is it what are we

1919
01:12:12,470 --> 01:12:10,880
protecting i don't know if you can

1920
01:12:13,510 --> 01:12:12,480
answer this question

1921
01:12:15,430 --> 01:12:13,520
uh

1922
01:12:17,750 --> 01:12:15,440
in this open forum

1923
01:12:19,510 --> 01:12:17,760
but in fact uh

1924
01:12:21,430 --> 01:12:19,520
your perception of what it is we have to

1925
01:12:23,590 --> 01:12:21,440
quote so i think right now what's really

1926
01:12:25,590 --> 01:12:23,600
important for us to protect is

1927
01:12:26,950 --> 01:12:25,600
how we know certain things so there are

1928
01:12:30,070 --> 01:12:26,960
a lot of things that we know whether it

1929
01:12:33,990 --> 01:12:32,470
the thinking of other leaders around the

1930
01:12:35,910 --> 01:12:34,000
world the weapon systems that are being

1931
01:12:37,750 --> 01:12:35,920
developed or how we detect things that

1932
01:12:39,510 --> 01:12:37,760
may be threats to us

1933
01:12:41,189 --> 01:12:39,520
many of those things are

1934
01:12:42,870 --> 01:12:41,199
the result of some of our most sensitive

1935
01:12:44,870 --> 01:12:42,880
sources and methods and we'll use those

1936
01:12:47,270 --> 01:12:44,880
things not just for this effort but

1937
01:12:50,149 --> 01:12:47,280
those same sources and methods are used

1938
01:12:51,990 --> 01:12:50,159
to help protect us from adversaries and

1939
01:12:53,750 --> 01:12:52,000
from others who might mean to do us harm

1940
01:12:56,790 --> 01:12:53,760
there aren't separate

1941
01:12:59,030 --> 01:12:56,800
uap sensors there's not a separate uap

1942
01:13:01,510 --> 01:12:59,040
processing computer it is not a separate

1943
01:13:03,350 --> 01:13:01,520
uap dissemination chain or whatever so

1944
01:13:05,110 --> 01:13:03,360
it's the same process it's the same

1945
01:13:08,149 --> 01:13:05,120
system that we have that helps us do all

1946
01:13:10,229 --> 01:13:08,159
that we need to protect that because

1947
01:13:11,750 --> 01:13:10,239
this is something that that we're

1948
01:13:12,870 --> 01:13:11,760
looking at but we're sure there's going

1949
01:13:14,550 --> 01:13:12,880
to be other things that we'll look at in

1950
01:13:16,310 --> 01:13:14,560
the future that will need those same

1951
01:13:17,910 --> 01:13:16,320
sensors we'll need those same sources

1952
01:13:19,910 --> 01:13:17,920
and methods to help us do so we're

1953
01:13:21,750 --> 01:13:19,920
protecting the fact of the that this

1954
01:13:24,709 --> 01:13:21,760
nation has developed capabilities that

1955
01:13:26,709 --> 01:13:24,719
enable us to know what may be

1956
01:13:29,510 --> 01:13:26,719
threats to us and to counter those

1957
01:13:31,830 --> 01:13:29,520
threats before they uh become something

1958
01:13:33,830 --> 01:13:31,840
of a a national issue thank you very

1959
01:13:35,910 --> 01:13:33,840
much i want to thank both you mr brand

1960
01:13:38,229 --> 01:13:35,920
you mr moultrie for your parents today i

1961
01:13:40,550 --> 01:13:38,239
yield back

1962
01:13:42,709 --> 01:13:40,560
gentleman yields back

1963
01:13:45,910 --> 01:13:42,719
gentlemen beyond videos

1964
01:13:47,910 --> 01:13:45,920
is there a range of other information

1965
01:13:50,229 --> 01:13:47,920
that the executive branch has that would

1966
01:13:51,990 --> 01:13:50,239
be valuable to the american people

1967
01:13:53,510 --> 01:13:52,000
while protecting sources and methods

1968
01:13:55,990 --> 01:13:53,520
obviously

1969
01:13:57,990 --> 01:13:56,000
the details of individual encounters

1970
01:14:01,270 --> 01:13:58,000
including the time place and details of

1971
01:14:04,149 --> 01:14:01,280
an encounter and does the aim song have

1972
01:14:05,270 --> 01:14:04,159
a clear and repeatable process

1973
01:14:08,070 --> 01:14:05,280
um

1974
01:14:10,229 --> 01:14:08,080
for considering public release

1975
01:14:12,070 --> 01:14:10,239
as part of the process

1976
01:14:13,510 --> 01:14:12,080
jaren carson the um do you commit to

1977
01:14:16,310 --> 01:14:13,520
building that process if it's not in

1978
01:14:18,390 --> 01:14:16,320
place uh the uap task force uh you know

1979
01:14:20,390 --> 01:14:18,400
the the security classification guide uh

1980
01:14:22,950 --> 01:14:20,400
that the uap task force has been

1981
01:14:24,310 --> 01:14:22,960
operating under that i approved

1982
01:14:27,110 --> 01:14:24,320
really was meant to protect those

1983
01:14:29,510 --> 01:14:27,120
sources and methods and meant to protect

1984
01:14:30,790 --> 01:14:29,520
any knowledge uh that an adversary

1985
01:14:32,229 --> 01:14:30,800
intelligence

1986
01:14:34,229 --> 01:14:32,239
entity may gain

1987
01:14:37,189 --> 01:14:34,239
from unders from understanding what

1988
01:14:39,830 --> 01:14:37,199
we're tracking how we track it or

1989
01:14:42,149 --> 01:14:39,840
when we're tracking it or if we're not

1990
01:14:44,149 --> 01:14:42,159
um and so that has been an important

1991
01:14:46,950 --> 01:14:44,159
piece uh in the balance between

1992
01:14:49,270 --> 01:14:46,960
transparency uh and preserving our

1993
01:14:51,990 --> 01:14:49,280
warfighting advantage because the u.s

1994
01:14:53,669 --> 01:14:52,000
military does train as it would fight

1995
01:14:56,310 --> 01:14:53,679
um what i

1996
01:14:59,030 --> 01:14:56,320
will commit to uh is at least for that

1997
01:15:00,149 --> 01:14:59,040
material it's under my authority

1998
01:15:02,070 --> 01:15:00,159
as the deputy director of naval

1999
01:15:04,070 --> 01:15:02,080
intelligence

2000
01:15:08,630 --> 01:15:04,080
for

2001
01:15:10,790 --> 01:15:08,640
not involve sources of methods

2002
01:15:12,870 --> 01:15:10,800
or and when we can

2003
01:15:14,550 --> 01:15:12,880
with a reasonable uh degree of

2004
01:15:16,550 --> 01:15:14,560
confidence determine that it does not

2005
01:15:18,709 --> 01:15:16,560
pose a foreign intelligence or national

2006
01:15:19,990 --> 01:15:18,719
security threat uh and it's within my

2007
01:15:22,470 --> 01:15:20,000
authority to do so i commit to

2008
01:15:24,630 --> 01:15:22,480
declassifying that so i i believe very

2009
01:15:26,870 --> 01:15:24,640
much in the transparency of this

2010
01:15:28,470 --> 01:15:26,880
and we work very hard to balance that

2011
01:15:30,550 --> 01:15:28,480
with our national security needs and

2012
01:15:33,110 --> 01:15:30,560
i'll just add congressman

2013
01:15:35,189 --> 01:15:33,120
just over the last three four months i

2014
01:15:37,590 --> 01:15:35,199
think that the

2015
01:15:39,270 --> 01:15:37,600
the intelligence community and the

2016
01:15:41,270 --> 01:15:39,280
national defense apparatus have

2017
01:15:43,510 --> 01:15:41,280
disclosed more information on various

2018
01:15:46,950 --> 01:15:43,520
events than it has and

2019
01:15:48,550 --> 01:15:46,960
probably see the the previous 10 years

2020
01:15:49,669 --> 01:15:48,560
you have our commitment to work closely

2021
01:15:51,430 --> 01:15:49,679
with the director of national

2022
01:15:52,990 --> 01:15:51,440
intelligence and

2023
01:15:55,030 --> 01:15:53,000
others in the

2024
01:15:56,229 --> 01:15:55,040
declassification and downgrading of

2025
01:15:57,669 --> 01:15:56,239
intel

2026
01:15:59,350 --> 01:15:57,679
apparatus to ensure that we can get

2027
01:16:01,350 --> 01:15:59,360
whatever information that we can out to

2028
01:16:02,950 --> 01:16:01,360
the american people and to the public at

2029
01:16:04,870 --> 01:16:02,960
large

2030
01:16:07,270 --> 01:16:04,880
greatly appreciate it sir ranking member

2031
01:16:09,910 --> 01:16:07,280
crawford thank you mr chairman um

2032
01:16:11,270 --> 01:16:09,920
representative stefanik is in route i

2033
01:16:13,189 --> 01:16:11,280
believe just real quickly but in the

2034
01:16:15,510 --> 01:16:13,199
interim if i could if you'll indulge me

2035
01:16:17,910 --> 01:16:15,520
i just have one a couple of real small

2036
01:16:20,070 --> 01:16:17,920
questions one is uh

2037
01:16:22,709 --> 01:16:20,080
do we have an example can you cite us a

2038
01:16:25,270 --> 01:16:22,719
specific example of an object that can't

2039
01:16:29,510 --> 01:16:25,280
be explained as having been human-made

2040
01:16:31,990 --> 01:16:30,760
i mean the the um

2041
01:16:33,910 --> 01:16:32,000
[Music]

2042
01:16:35,270 --> 01:16:33,920
the example that

2043
01:16:37,430 --> 01:16:35,280
that i would say that we that is still

2044
01:16:39,910 --> 01:16:37,440
unresolved uh that i think everyone

2045
01:16:43,510 --> 01:16:39,920
understands quite well is the 2004 uh

2046
01:16:45,910 --> 01:16:43,520
incident from from nimitz uh we have

2047
01:16:48,470 --> 01:16:45,920
data on that and that simply remains

2048
01:16:50,870 --> 01:16:48,480
unresolved uh does not mean it resolves

2049
01:16:52,229 --> 01:16:50,880
to being something right that is easily

2050
01:16:53,830 --> 01:16:52,239
explainable or

2051
01:16:55,350 --> 01:16:53,840
difficulty or well obviously it resolves

2052
01:16:56,390 --> 01:16:55,360
to being something that is difficult to

2053
01:16:58,550 --> 01:16:56,400
explain

2054
01:17:00,709 --> 01:16:58,560
but i i can't point to something that

2055
01:17:02,070 --> 01:17:00,719
definitively was not

2056
01:17:04,149 --> 01:17:02,080
manmade but i can point to a number of

2057
01:17:06,550 --> 01:17:04,159
examples and which remain unresolved

2058
01:17:08,470 --> 01:17:06,560
gotcha uh with regard to videos that

2059
01:17:10,390 --> 01:17:08,480
have appeared in open source channels

2060
01:17:12,470 --> 01:17:10,400
for example the tic tac video

2061
01:17:14,149 --> 01:17:12,480
does aimsog maintain control of videos

2062
01:17:16,229 --> 01:17:14,159
and how do you prevent

2063
01:17:18,630 --> 01:17:16,239
leaks of potentially classified videos

2064
01:17:21,350 --> 01:17:18,640
or other material

2065
01:17:24,070 --> 01:17:21,360
so the aims log as we establish that

2066
01:17:26,390 --> 01:17:24,080
organization we will have a

2067
01:17:28,229 --> 01:17:26,400
a process for classified and

2068
01:17:29,990 --> 01:17:28,239
compartmented holdings and we will find

2069
01:17:31,990 --> 01:17:30,000
a way of getting positive control over

2070
01:17:33,590 --> 01:17:32,000
those we have

2071
01:17:35,350 --> 01:17:33,600
our sensitive access programs and

2072
01:17:37,110 --> 01:17:35,360
special access programs that allow us to

2073
01:17:39,110 --> 01:17:37,120
put what we call saps around things and

2074
01:17:41,270 --> 01:17:39,120
then there's controlled access programs

2075
01:17:42,709 --> 01:17:41,280
that allow us put caps around things so

2076
01:17:46,070 --> 01:17:42,719
we'll have that

2077
01:17:47,669 --> 01:17:46,080
in place our goal will be

2078
01:17:49,030 --> 01:17:47,679
ensuring that we're sharing that with

2079
01:17:51,270 --> 01:17:49,040
the appropriate analysts and the

2080
01:17:52,709 --> 01:17:51,280
appropriate exploiters if you will who

2081
01:17:55,030 --> 01:17:52,719
can look at that data too what we don't

2082
01:17:57,510 --> 01:17:55,040
want to do is bring something into a dod

2083
01:17:58,790 --> 01:17:57,520
database or a dod holding and then have

2084
01:18:01,030 --> 01:17:58,800
so many rappers around it's not

2085
01:18:02,790 --> 01:18:01,040
available to those who really need to

2086
01:18:04,390 --> 01:18:02,800
look at it and to exploit it and that's

2087
01:18:06,229 --> 01:18:04,400
one of the reasons we're establishing

2088
01:18:07,830 --> 01:18:06,239
relationships with the interagency with

2089
01:18:10,229 --> 01:18:07,840
the ic and others to be able to do that

2090
01:18:11,990 --> 01:18:10,239
sir but we will do our best to maintain

2091
01:18:13,669 --> 01:18:12,000
positive control over the materials that

2092
01:18:15,590 --> 01:18:13,679
we have within our holdings

2093
01:18:17,830 --> 01:18:15,600
thank you

2094
01:18:19,510 --> 01:18:17,840
chairmanship

2095
01:18:22,630 --> 01:18:19,520
thank you mr chairman just going back to

2096
01:18:24,550 --> 01:18:22,640
the 2021 report um

2097
01:18:26,630 --> 01:18:24,560
you know under the category of

2098
01:18:28,950 --> 01:18:26,640
uap appear to demonstrate advanced

2099
01:18:31,270 --> 01:18:28,960
technology those 18

2100
01:18:32,550 --> 01:18:31,280
incidents

2101
01:18:33,910 --> 01:18:32,560
in which

2102
01:18:35,750 --> 01:18:33,920
some of the uap

2103
01:18:37,669 --> 01:18:35,760
appear to remain stationary winds aloft

2104
01:18:39,830 --> 01:18:37,679
move against the wind maneuver abruptly

2105
01:18:42,070 --> 01:18:39,840
or move at considerable speed without

2106
01:18:43,669 --> 01:18:42,080
discernible means of propulsion

2107
01:18:46,149 --> 01:18:43,679
it goes on to say in a small number of

2108
01:18:48,790 --> 01:18:46,159
cases military aircraft systems

2109
01:18:52,470 --> 01:18:48,800
processed radio frequency energy

2110
01:18:53,910 --> 01:18:52,480
associated with uap sightings

2111
01:18:55,910 --> 01:18:53,920
i couldn't tell from that whether that

2112
01:18:59,830 --> 01:18:55,920
small number of cases

2113
01:19:02,950 --> 01:18:59,840
was a part of the subset of 18 that is

2114
01:19:04,630 --> 01:19:02,960
uh among the 18 which appeared to move

2115
01:19:05,990 --> 01:19:04,640
uh with unusual pattern or flight

2116
01:19:08,229 --> 01:19:06,000
characteristics

2117
01:19:14,070 --> 01:19:08,239
to some of those

2118
01:19:17,510 --> 01:19:16,229
i would have to check with our uap task

2119
01:19:19,110 --> 01:19:17,520
force on that i

2120
01:19:21,030 --> 01:19:19,120
uh

2121
01:19:22,390 --> 01:19:21,040
i believe without getting into specifics

2122
01:19:25,189 --> 01:19:22,400
that we can do in the in the closed

2123
01:19:28,470 --> 01:19:25,199
session uh at least some that we have

2124
01:19:32,870 --> 01:19:28,480
detected uh rf uh emissions from we're

2125
01:19:34,830 --> 01:19:32,880
not uh uh behaving uh oddly otherwise

2126
01:19:38,390 --> 01:19:34,840
uh and and the significance

2127
01:19:39,750 --> 01:19:38,400
of uh measuring that radio frequency

2128
01:19:42,310 --> 01:19:39,760
energy

2129
01:19:44,550 --> 01:19:42,320
is what that uh we suspect that this was

2130
01:19:46,950 --> 01:19:44,560
a some form of aircraft in which there

2131
01:19:48,310 --> 01:19:46,960
were radio transmissions

2132
01:19:50,229 --> 01:19:48,320
the biggest thing that you're looking

2133
01:19:51,910 --> 01:19:50,239
for there is any indication of of an

2134
01:19:53,350 --> 01:19:51,920
effort to jam

2135
01:19:55,910 --> 01:19:53,360
whatever sensors that we may have

2136
01:19:57,430 --> 01:19:55,920
looking at it but i would also also add

2137
01:19:59,510 --> 01:19:57,440
to that that

2138
01:20:02,390 --> 01:19:59,520
radio frequency as you know congressman

2139
01:20:05,830 --> 01:20:02,400
is used to control uh various platforms

2140
01:20:09,030 --> 01:20:05,840
too so the fact of uh emanations coming

2141
01:20:11,030 --> 01:20:09,040
off of any platform whether it be a uav

2142
01:20:12,310 --> 01:20:11,040
or another platform

2143
01:20:16,310 --> 01:20:12,320
could be

2144
01:20:17,430 --> 01:20:16,320
radio frequency activity related to that

2145
01:20:19,350 --> 01:20:17,440
entity

2146
01:20:21,510 --> 01:20:19,360
transmitting out or

2147
01:20:23,510 --> 01:20:21,520
something transmitting to that platform

2148
01:20:25,189 --> 01:20:23,520
and of course we have a sensitivity with

2149
01:20:26,870 --> 01:20:25,199
our airborne platforms and picking it up

2150
01:20:28,310 --> 01:20:26,880
which is one of the reasons that we try

2151
01:20:30,070 --> 01:20:28,320
to prevent people from using their cell

2152
01:20:32,470 --> 01:20:30,080
phones on airplanes and things like that

2153
01:20:34,390 --> 01:20:32,480
it's very sensitive to rf and emanation

2154
01:20:36,149 --> 01:20:34,400
so that's a part of what we'll be

2155
01:20:38,229 --> 01:20:36,159
looking at in the ames log what is this

2156
01:20:40,149 --> 01:20:38,239
is this something that we can collect on

2157
01:20:41,990 --> 01:20:40,159
and can we start to characterize the

2158
01:20:43,430 --> 01:20:42,000
signaling environment around the

2159
01:20:45,350 --> 01:20:43,440
emanations that may be coming off of

2160
01:20:48,390 --> 01:20:45,360
some of these uaps

2161
01:20:51,030 --> 01:20:48,400
so that that energy then um that was

2162
01:20:52,550 --> 01:20:51,040
recorded could be either

2163
01:20:54,950 --> 01:20:52,560
an effort to jam or it could be an

2164
01:20:57,430 --> 01:20:54,960
effort to control a uav

2165
01:20:58,149 --> 01:20:57,440
um

2166
01:21:00,790 --> 01:20:58,159
or

2167
01:21:03,030 --> 01:21:00,800
any other communication with that uh

2168
01:21:05,510 --> 01:21:03,040
craft i would say that's accurate

2169
01:21:07,430 --> 01:21:05,520
right thank you mr chairman

2170
01:21:11,350 --> 01:21:07,440
thank you chairman

2171
01:21:14,790 --> 01:21:11,360
um at as the odni report makes clear one

2172
01:21:17,590 --> 01:21:14,800
possible explanation for uaps is that we

2173
01:21:21,510 --> 01:21:17,600
are detecting u.s aircraft either secret

2174
01:21:23,030 --> 01:21:21,520
air programs or even test prototypes

2175
01:21:25,590 --> 01:21:23,040
i won't ask you in this setting

2176
01:21:28,550 --> 01:21:25,600
obviously to describe any secret dod

2177
01:21:30,550 --> 01:21:28,560
programs that said i do want to make

2178
01:21:32,950 --> 01:21:30,560
sure the u.s government isn't chasing

2179
01:21:34,790 --> 01:21:32,960
its own tail

2180
01:21:36,950 --> 01:21:34,800
firstly do you have a clear and

2181
01:21:39,189 --> 01:21:36,960
repeatable process to check with

2182
01:21:42,070 --> 01:21:39,199
compartment programs about whether a uap

2183
01:21:43,270 --> 01:21:42,080
sighting is attributable to a u.s

2184
01:21:44,870 --> 01:21:43,280
aircraft

2185
01:21:46,229 --> 01:21:44,880
uh secondly do

2186
01:21:48,629 --> 01:21:46,239
does the aimsaw

2187
01:21:50,149 --> 01:21:48,639
staff have the clearances

2188
01:21:52,070 --> 01:21:50,159
and read-ons

2189
01:21:54,709 --> 01:21:52,080
that they need to investigate all of

2190
01:21:58,709 --> 01:21:54,719
these incidents and and thirdly

2191
01:22:00,950 --> 01:21:58,719
when your staff cannot be read on

2192
01:22:03,030 --> 01:22:00,960
are your questions to those who are read

2193
01:22:05,350 --> 01:22:03,040
on even being answered

2194
01:22:08,070 --> 01:22:05,360
so i'll start and then uh i'll pass that

2195
01:22:11,189 --> 01:22:08,080
to uh to mr bray so we're very conscious

2196
01:22:13,350 --> 01:22:11,199
of the potential blue on blue issue or

2197
01:22:15,030 --> 01:22:13,360
us on u.s and so

2198
01:22:17,510 --> 01:22:15,040
we've established relationships with

2199
01:22:19,110 --> 01:22:17,520
organizations and entities that

2200
01:22:20,390 --> 01:22:19,120
that are

2201
01:22:22,790 --> 01:22:20,400
potentially

2202
01:22:25,590 --> 01:22:22,800
flying or developing platforms for their

2203
01:22:27,270 --> 01:22:25,600
own interests if you will and our goal

2204
01:22:29,110 --> 01:22:27,280
is to continue and we have a repeatable

2205
01:22:30,390 --> 01:22:29,120
process i think we've had that process

2206
01:22:33,750 --> 01:22:30,400
for some time

2207
01:22:35,430 --> 01:22:33,760
to deconflict uh activities that we may

2208
01:22:37,270 --> 01:22:35,440
have to ensure that we are not

2209
01:22:38,390 --> 01:22:37,280
potentially reporting on something that

2210
01:22:41,350 --> 01:22:38,400
may be

2211
01:22:44,390 --> 01:22:41,360
a developmental platform or a u.s

2212
01:22:46,229 --> 01:22:44,400
operational platform that is performing

2213
01:22:48,070 --> 01:22:46,239
either testing or performing a mission

2214
01:22:49,590 --> 01:22:48,080
so we will have that

2215
01:22:51,590 --> 01:22:49,600
in place we've already had those

2216
01:22:54,470 --> 01:22:51,600
discussions with organizations and

2217
01:22:56,950 --> 01:22:54,480
entities we want to uh ensure that we're

2218
01:22:58,149 --> 01:22:56,960
protecting their equities we want to

2219
01:23:00,310 --> 01:22:58,159
ensure that we're protecting their

2220
01:23:01,910 --> 01:23:00,320
sources and methods while also getting

2221
01:23:03,910 --> 01:23:01,920
at what we have here we want to be able

2222
01:23:06,070 --> 01:23:03,920
to deconflict those

2223
01:23:08,870 --> 01:23:06,080
absolutely the uap task force has uh uh

2224
01:23:09,830 --> 01:23:08,880
had a a process in place to work uh with

2225
01:23:10,870 --> 01:23:09,840
other elements of the department of

2226
01:23:13,350 --> 01:23:10,880
defense and other elements of the

2227
01:23:16,070 --> 01:23:13,360
government to ensure that uh that there

2228
01:23:18,229 --> 01:23:16,080
is an uh as simple a way as possible to

2229
01:23:20,709 --> 01:23:18,239
deconflict those and when we reference

2230
01:23:22,310 --> 01:23:20,719
that in the in the report uh i should

2231
01:23:23,750 --> 01:23:22,320
say that we were

2232
01:23:25,189 --> 01:23:23,760
simply accounting for the fact that

2233
01:23:28,070 --> 01:23:25,199
there could

2234
01:23:29,750 --> 01:23:28,080
possibly be one or two uh data points

2235
01:23:31,270 --> 01:23:29,760
that had that it leaked through but we

2236
01:23:34,310 --> 01:23:31,280
were quite confident that was not the

2237
01:23:38,950 --> 01:23:37,510
um how how are you all liaisoning with

2238
01:23:40,870 --> 01:23:38,960
um

2239
01:23:43,910 --> 01:23:40,880
space command

2240
01:23:45,110 --> 01:23:43,920
specifically how are you partnering with

2241
01:23:46,709 --> 01:23:45,120
the parts

2242
01:23:48,709 --> 01:23:46,719
of the u.s based

2243
01:23:49,830 --> 01:23:48,719
command responsible for space domain

2244
01:23:51,910 --> 01:23:49,840
awareness

2245
01:23:54,149 --> 01:23:51,920
and how if at all are you

2246
01:23:57,510 --> 01:23:54,159
partnering with the space force to

2247
01:24:00,950 --> 01:23:59,640
the uap task force has

2248
01:24:02,950 --> 01:24:00,960
[Music]

2249
01:24:04,229 --> 01:24:02,960
has a very good uh relationship uh with

2250
01:24:06,790 --> 01:24:04,239
space force as it does with the rest of

2251
01:24:08,790 --> 01:24:06,800
the department of defense uh we have uh

2252
01:24:11,270 --> 01:24:08,800
pulled analysts in from space force to

2253
01:24:13,590 --> 01:24:11,280
ensure that uh uh that we're availing

2254
01:24:17,110 --> 01:24:13,600
ourselves of that expertise uh as well

2255
01:24:18,709 --> 01:24:17,120
as um uh any um any other material they

2256
01:24:21,430 --> 01:24:18,719
may have that would be helpful

2257
01:24:23,669 --> 01:24:21,440
and the congressman as you know

2258
01:24:25,350 --> 01:24:23,679
space force and space command they have

2259
01:24:27,030 --> 01:24:25,360
responsibility for space domain

2260
01:24:29,350 --> 01:24:27,040
awareness so what we've done we

2261
01:24:32,629 --> 01:24:29,360
coordinated with with space force we

2262
01:24:34,550 --> 01:24:32,639
coordinated with their j2 and uh she is

2263
01:24:35,590 --> 01:24:34,560
on board in terms of helping us plug

2264
01:24:37,910 --> 01:24:35,600
into

2265
01:24:39,910 --> 01:24:37,920
what they have and for us to have this

2266
01:24:41,430 --> 01:24:39,920
interactive exchange of information and

2267
01:24:43,110 --> 01:24:41,440
data and we're doing that with all the

2268
01:24:45,030 --> 01:24:43,120
services not just with space force or

2269
01:24:46,790 --> 01:24:45,040
spacecraft

2270
01:24:48,149 --> 01:24:46,800
thank you sir ranking member any

2271
01:24:50,470 --> 01:24:48,159
additional questions all right

2272
01:24:52,229 --> 01:24:50,480
chairmanship

2273
01:24:53,990 --> 01:24:52,239
all right uh with that i want to thank

2274
01:24:55,910 --> 01:24:54,000
you all for for taking the time out i

2275
01:24:57,590 --> 01:24:55,920
also want to thank my colleagues on both

2276
01:25:00,070 --> 01:24:57,600
sides of the aisle for

2277
01:25:02,709 --> 01:25:00,080
participating in this very

2278
01:25:04,870 --> 01:25:02,719
historical and important

2279
01:25:06,790 --> 01:25:04,880
hearing i think it's one of the few

2280
01:25:09,990 --> 01:25:06,800
times we can demonstrate some degree of

2281
01:25:12,070 --> 01:25:10,000
bipartisanship around uaps and ufos so i

2282
01:25:14,070 --> 01:25:12,080
love it i appreciate it thank you and we

2283
01:25:15,830 --> 01:25:14,080
will see you all we will recess this